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Abstract
Growing franchise systems are admired and rewarded favorably by press, seen as
“growth engines” in investor stock portfolios, and attract significant interest from
potential franchisees. Yet growth brings with it the specter of intra-brand competition,
and its attendant ill effect of sharply reducing the motivation of franchisees – the very
drivers of such growth. Facing competition from their very own, franchisees indulge in
shirking, in turn eliciting franchisor terminations in ever greater numbers as they run
afoul of the franchise agreement. These franchisor terminations, in turn, may
subsequently affect the financial position of franchise systems in terms of sales and
profitability. It is therefore worth investigating the relational and financial consequences
of franchise system growth. Importantly, it is useful to uncover means of growing even
while reducing the extent to which terminations might even be necessary.
Further, as a franchise system’s growth in a particular market fosters geographic
proximity or clustering of the same-brand outlets leading to intrabrand competition, it is
useful to uncover the conditions under which this proximity is beneficial or harmful to
the same-brand outlets’ performance. Proximal same-brand outlets may share knowledge
while competing with one another. The boundary conditions where one effect overcomes
the other are worth exploring.
My dissertation comprises two essays assessing the performance implications of growth
and geography in the context of franchising at two different levels of analysis – at the
franchise system-, and at the individual outlet-level. My first essay traces the growth in
the retail footprint – the number of outlets operating – of 75 franchise systems operating
in 11 industries, observed over up to thirteen years. In contrast, essay 2 examines the
implications of growth-induced proximity for each of the 988 individual outlets of a
single franchise system from its inception in 1977 until 2012. Overall, my findings
suggest that franchise system growth increases franchisor terminations of franchisees, but
the likelihood of these terminations may be reduced if growth relies on ownership of
franchisor outlets, higher royalty rate, or clustering of outlets. Furthermore, the impact of
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clustering of outlets on their performance is contingent on outlets’ experience and the
governance context.

Keywords: Franchising, Growth, Governance, Geography, Performance.

iii

Statement of Authorship
This is to certify that I am the principal author and have had a major role in the
preparation and writing of the manuscript (per
http://grad.uwo.ca/current_students/regulations/8.html).
Essay 1 (Franchise System Growth and Franchisors’ Relationship Termination
Behavior)

Data with respect to the 75 franchise systems and their outlet growth patterns across 50
US states were made available to me by my thesis supervisor Dr. Kersi D. Antia. To
these, I added market-level descriptors (population, income, taxes, GDP, and area).
Under the supervision of Dr. Antia, I took the lead on model specification, estimation,
and interpretation of results obtained. Dr. Antia and I collaborated on the positioning of
essay 1 in manuscript form, the identification of relevant theoretical lenses, the rationale
underlying each hypothesis, and all corresponding tables and figures in support of the
self-contained manuscript that we submitted for potential publication to the Journal of
Marketing Research. The manuscript has been invited for resubmission by the journal
and the order of authorship – Butt and Antia – accurately reflects our respective
contributions.

iv

Essay 2 (Clustering, Governance, and Individual Outlet Sales: A Multi-Year
Analysis of an Evolving Franchise System)

Data on the single franchise system examined in this essay are provided by Drs. Kersi D.
Antia, Vishal Kashyap, and Brian Murtha. With their collaboration and under the
supervision of Dr. Antia, I am responsible for outlet geocoding (so as to pinpoint each of
the 988 outlets comprising the franchise system in our sample), computation of additional
geospatial variables, and match-merging of additional data for each of the 270 US
counties where each of the outlets of the franchise system are located. As in essay 1, Dr.
Antia supervised me closely with respect to the model specification approach, technical
rigor, theoretical perspectives included, and hypotheses rationale development. Multiple
early drafts of the resulting manuscript were vetted by Dr. Antia, and subsequently by
Drs. Kashyap and Murtha. The resulting manuscript is under second round review at
Journal of Marketing and its order of authorship – Butt, Antia, Murtha, and Kashyap –
accurately reflects our respective contributions.

v

Acknowledgements
My four-year stay at Ivey has been a period of intense learning for me, and has been
nothing short of amazing. I would like to reflect on the people who have supported and
helped me so much throughout my Ph.D. program.

First and foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor Professor
Kersi D. Antia for his continuous support of my Ph.D. study and research. I could not
have imagined having a better advisor and mentor for my Ph.D. study. He helped me
come up with the thesis topic and his guidance helped me immensely in improving the
quality of my research and writing of this thesis. Where I am today would not have been
possible without his enduring support throughout this process. It has been a pleasure
working with him and I look forward to continuing this collaboration going forward.

Besides my advisor, I would like to thank Professor Neil Bendle, whose mentorship has
been instrumental in my Ph.D. journey. Right from my admission until my graduation,
his role has been pivotal in my success. I had a great time working with Professor Bendle
and learning from him. Furthermore, I would like to thank the rest of my thesis
examination committee members: Professor Shane Wang, Professor Trevor Hunter, and
Professor Erik Mooi for their encouragement, insightful comments, and feedback.

My sincere thanks also go to Professor Matthew Thomson for his immense support and
encouragement throughout my Ph.D. program. Further, I want to say thanks to Ph.D.
program office staff for their timely administrative support.

Last but not the least, I am fortunate to have the most wonderful and supportive family in
this world. I would like to thank my mother, wife, and brothers for standing by me and
for providing encouragement throughout my stay in Canada.

vi

Table of Contents

Abstract

i

Statement of Authorship

iii

Acknowledgements

v

Table of Contents

vi

Chapter 1: Introduction

1

Franchising: Definition and Importance to the Economy
Growth
Governance
Geography
Essay 1: Overview and Research Question
Essay 2: Overview and Research Question
Insights and Anticipated Contributions
References
Figures

1
3
6
8
10
11
11
14
18

Chapter 2: Essay 1

19

Background
Hypotheses
Method
Discussion
References
Tables
Figures
Appendices

22
24
29
43
48
54
60
62

Chapter 3: Essay 2

64

Conceptual Background
Hypotheses
Research Method
Discussion
References
Tables
Figures
Appendices

68
72
79
89
95
101
108
112

vii
Chapter 4: Conclusion
Discussion
Practical Implications
Limitations
Future Research
References
Tables
Curriculum Vitae

114
114
116
119
120
122
123
124

1

Chapter 1

Introduction
1.1) Franchising: Definition and Importance to the Economy
Franchising is a commonly used form of business, especially in the retail and service
sectors (Bradach and Eccles 1989; Combs and Ketchen 2003). Franchise businesses make
a significant contribution to the economy. In the US, a new franchise business opens
every eight minutes, and 900,000 franchise outlets in the US generate over two trillion
dollars in economic output and about 50 per cent of retail sales (International Franchise
Association 2016). After the US, Canada is home to the second largest franchise business
market in the world, with over 78,000 franchise units. The Canadian franchise industry
generates approximately $68 billion in revenue every year (Canadian Franchise
Association 2016).

A franchise arrangement involves the owner of a product or service (the franchisor)
selling the right to use its brand name, product specifications, and business model to
another party (the franchisee) in a specific location and time period, typically in exchange
for an upfront fee plus ongoing royalties as a percentage of sales (Combs, Michael, and
Castrogiovanni 2004).
Two different types of franchising relationships exist – product distribution franchising
and business format franchising (International Franchise Association 2016).

Product Distribution/Trademark Franchising. In a product distribution franchise
relationship, also known as trademark or traditional franchising, the franchisor makes
available a product to the franchisee (Alon 2001; Lafontaine 1992). Typically, the
product is sold with a mark-up to the franchisee, who then goes on to sell it at a further

2

profit. Examples of product distribution franchising can be found in the beverage, retail,
gasoline, and automotive sectors.

Business Format Franchising. In marked contrast to trademark franchising, in a business
format franchise relationship, the franchisor provides to the franchisee not just its brand
name, products, and services, but an entire system for operating the business. The
franchisee generally receives support from the franchisor in the form of site selection and
development, operating manuals, training, quality control, and a marketing strategy (Sen
1998; Sorenson and Sorenson 2001). In return, the franchisee agrees to comply with all
the stipulated contractual obligations, and to pay the franchisor an initial one-time
payment and an ongoing stream of royalties, typically expressed as a percentage of gross
sales. Business format franchising is widespread and especially popular in industries like
fast food and full-service restaurants, hotels, and personal and business services (Combs
and Ketchen 2003; Srinivasan 2006).
A franchise agreement is a partnership between the two parties, whereby the franchisor’s
brand name and operational know-how are wedded to the franchisee’s effort, compliance,
and capital. As such, franchising is considered a very effective vehicle for growth. Yet
growth, in turn, poses challenges for the franchisor and its franchisees alike. The
franchisor is challenged to ensure that system uniformity is maintained (Bradach 1997).
Franchisees are constantly exposed to the risk of competing “with their own” as new
same-brand outlets open in their vicinity (Pancras, Sriram, and Kumar 2012). Together,
these considerations underscore the importance not only of growth, but also of
appropriate mechanisms deployed by the franchisor to ensure system uniformity
(governance), and of the specific location/proximity of outlets (geography) − what I refer
to as growth, governance, and geography.

My dissertation seeks to assess the performance implications of growth, governance, and
geography in the context of business format franchising. My choice of the business
format franchising context is guided by at least three considerations. First, relative to
product distribution/trademark franchising, business format franchising demands more
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coordination and communication between franchisor and franchisees. Second, and
primarily because of the shared brand, the performance implications of not following
guidelines spill over beyond the focal outlet to others sharing the same brand. Third,
business format franchising is the more common and increasingly popular type of
franchising (International Franchise Association 2016). The next section includes a
discussion of each of the three aspects of growth, governance, and geography in the
context of business format franchising.

1.2) Growth

A significant body of prior research has equated firm growth with success (Shane 1996;
Slater 1980). Such growth, whether reflected in increased sales (Sorenson and Sorensen
2001), number of employees (Evans 1987), or number of outlets (Shane 1996; Shane,
Shankar, and Aravindakshan 2006), is thought to confer economies of scale (Geroski
1995; Shane 1996), and increase the likelihood of firm survival (Shane 1996). Within the
context of franchising, growth is primarily thought of with respect to market coverage –
the number of outlets in total, whether franchisor- or franchisee-owned. Such growth has
always attracted interest and adulation; consider, for example, the statement, “If you're
one of those who likes things to move fast, who wants a new challenge all of the time,
then maybe a fast-growing franchise is for you” (Entrepreneur 2017).

The imperative for growth is even more pronounced for franchise systems due to their
incentive structure (Martin 1988). Franchisors’ dependence on gross revenue-based
royalties and the need to attract strong franchisee partners create a compelling incentive
to grow the franchise system by expanding the number of outlets (Kaufmann and Rangan
1990). Yet, it is also well known that franchise systems struggle to achieve a delicate
balance when managing growth in their retail footprint. Too slow, and they risk stagnant
sales and sub-optimal scale; too fast, and they face the devastating losses that accompany
an unrestrained increase in footprint.
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Franchise system growth poses communication and coordination challenges for
franchisors and strains their financial and managerial resources (Eisenhardt 1988;
Penrose 1959; Shane 1996). The more far-flung the outlets, the greater the cost of
coordinating them, and the lesser the franchisor’s ability to ensure compliance with
established operating procedures (Brickley and Dark 1987). These growth-related
communication and coordination difficulties as well as resource constraints make the
monitoring difficult which, in turn, enhances the shirking propensity of franchisees1.
Greater shirking leads to greater instances of non-compliance (Bergen, Dutta, and Walker
1992), which likely result in a greater need for franchisor terminations2 to weed out nonperforming franchisees and to keep the system efficient and profitable.

Prior literature has made significant contributions to understanding franchise system
growth and its drivers. Work by Brickley and Dark 1987, Lafontaine 1992, Norton 1988,
and Shane 1996 provides support for the role of franchising in mitigating the agency
problems of adverse selection and moral hazard, in turn helping achieve faster growth.
Jindal 2011 and Kaufman and Dant 1996 also examine how franchise systems might
grow; their work emphasizes the role of multi-unit franchising – an arrangement under
which franchisees are allowed to own and operate multiple units – in reducing the
franchisor burden of communication and coordination with its individual franchisees.
Norton 1988 suggests that physically dispersed outlets are best franchised rather than
company-owned. Most recently, Shane, Shankar, and Arvindakshan 2006 find that fast
growing franchise systems fuel their growth by offering lower royalty rates and initial
franchise fees, relying on self-owned outlets less, and lowering the initial investment
required of their franchisees via financing assistance. Kosova and Lafontaine 2010
uncover a “ceiling effect”, as older and larger franchise systems tend to exhibit lower
system growth.

1

I acknowledge that franchisors are also prone to shirking with respect to their obligations, resulting in a
situation known as double moral hazard (Lafontaine 1992); Klein (1980) suggests that concern for their
brand reputation serves as a bond against franchisor shirking.
Hereinafter, my use of the term “franchisor terminations” refers to franchisors’ termination of their
franchisees.
2
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Despite these important contributions, prior research falls short of providing a definitive
answer regarding the consequences of growth. In particular, three shortcomings are worth
noting. First, the overwhelming focus of extant research has been on identifying the
drivers of outlet growth, emphasizing growth as an end in itself (Eisenhardt 1988;
Kalnins 2004; Pancras, Sriram, and Kumar 2012; Penrose 1959). This focus on growth
presumes growth to be a positive outcome. Several real-life business cases (e.g.,
Subway’s rapid growth and its declining same-store sales in the US, Wall Street Journal,
August 15, 2015) contradict this assumption and demonstrate that greater growth is not
synonymous with higher performance.

A second major limitation of extant research on growth pertains to its emphasis on yearover-year (YOY) growth differentials. The benefit of such an approach is the relative
ease with which growth (i.e., increases or decreases relative to the prior year) may be
inferred. The prime disadvantage of such a static view, however, lies in its single point in
time focus (Palmatier Houston, Dant, and Grewal 2013), resulting in “…an incomplete
picture of the signaling phenomenon in the marketplace” (DeKinder and Kohli 2008,
p.84). Potential franchisees are more interested in the value of the growth trend of a
franchise system over an extended period of time. This growth trend or flow signal as
DeKinder and Kohli 2008 refer to it discounts the fluctuations attendant to YOY growth
considerations. The absence of such an analysis from the extant growth literature
represents a significant obstacle to gaining a better understanding of growth-related
performance effects.

A third gap in our understanding of growth-attributable performance outcomes lies in the
inadequate attention paid to how such growth occurs. An increasing retail footprint
results in a “spread” of the markets covered, and a corresponding increase in the costs of
communicating with and coordinating far flung outlets (Brickley and Dark 1987). At
least three mechanisms have been identified as potential solutions to this coordination
problem: establishing franchisor-owned outlets (i.e., ownership-based governance)
(Brickley and Dark 1987), increasing franchisor incentives to maintain quality (i.e.,
royalty rate) (Lal 1990), and clustering outlets (i.e., geographic proximity) (Lu and
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Wedig 2013). Notwithstanding recent theoretical developments (Bell, Tracey, and Heide
2009; Tracey, Heide, and Bell 2014) that point to an intriguing interplay between the
geographic proximity inherent to clustering of outlets and the governance thereof, an
empirical assessment of the interplay of growth, governance, and geography as yet
awaits.

1.3) Governance
Palay (1984), p.265 defines governance as “…the institutional framework in which
contracts are initiated, negotiated, monitored, adapted, and terminated.” Within the
context of business format franchising, ownership of the outlet represents a
significant governance mechanism (Srinivasan 2006). Two aspects of ownership, in
particular, are worth noting, 1) ownership-based governance, and 2) shared
ownership.

Ownership-based governance reflects the extent to which the franchisor owns and
operates some outlets even while franchising others (Heide 2003; Srinivasan 2006).
The presence of franchisor-owned outlets along with franchisee-owned outlets
ensures greater control of franchisor over operations, products, and profits (Heide
1994). This vertical integration enhances the credibility of the franchisor's contract
termination safeguard, curtails franchisees’ opportunism, and reduces the franchisor's
vulnerability (Dutta, Bergen, Heide, and John 1995). Over the last three decades, a
significant body of work in economics, marketing, and management has identified the
drivers (e.g., Dutta et al.1995; Heide 1994, 2003) of ownership-based governance and
its consequences (e.g., Michael 2000; Srinivasan 2006) alike. One of the highly cited
advantages of ownership-based governance is the synergy it brings (Lafontaine and
Kaufmann 1994; Martin 1988). Franchisors gain and leverage their experience in
their self-owned outlets, over which they have control. Subsequently, they model
responses in franchisee-owned outlets, over which they have much less control.
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Furthermore, Bradach (1997) finds evidence of a two-way, mutual-learning process
between franchisor and franchisee-owned outlets, which he calls the "ratcheting
process”, whereby both sides influence each other, raising the level of uniformity and
the performance of the franchise system as a whole (Srinivasan 2006).

At the individual outlet-level, it is also important to understand the impact of shared
ownership of the focal and proximal outlets (e.g., multi-unit franchisees). Shared
ownership positively affects the knowledge transfer process by enhancing the motivation
of outlets to seek and share knowledge with one another (Argote and Darr 2000; Darr and
Kurtzberg 2000). Relatedly, proximal outlets that share ownership are likely to transfer
knowledge through contact learning via the transmission of routines through personal
and formal relationships, rather than requiring the focal outlet to rely on mimetic learning
via observation or vicarious learning of routines from its proximal outlets (Baum and
Ingram 1998; Miner and Haunschild 1995). As well, and perhaps as important, shared
ownership of the clustered outlets weakens the competition intensity between the focal
and proximal outlets (Kalnins and Lafontaine 2004).

Governance has a very important role to play in franchising, but at least two
limitations remain. First, prior research has mostly studied the ownership context at
the system-level (e.g., across all 50 US states) (Heide 2003; Srinivasan 2006). A
firm’s relative reliance on franchisor-owned outlets over time may vary significantly
across the different markets the firm competes in. This is evident in Figure 1, which
displays the ownership-based governance strategy of KFC at the system-level (Panel
A) as well as in each of two US states (regional markets; Panels B, C). The
overwhelming focus of prior work on system-level ownership-based governance
hides the individual market-level dynamics and their performance consequences.

Second, extant literature provides little insight as to how performance outcomes may
vary by ownership form. For a variety of reasons, franchisees are likely to be more
vulnerable to intrabrand competition relative to franchisor-owned outlets and to
benefit less from the knowledge transfer opportunity. Franchisors receive royalties as
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a percentage of franchisees’ sales and not of their profits (Lafontaine 1992). They are
therefore incentivized to open new franchisee-owned outlets in close proximity to
existing outlets as long as the total sales revenue across the existing and newly
established outlets increases (Kalnins 2004). Further, franchisee-owned outlets are
likely to gain less from knowledge transfer from proximal same-brand outlets due to
franchisors’ reliance on iron-clad contractual agreements (Kashyap, Antia, and
Frazier 2012) that reduce the leeway available to franchisees to make significant
changes in response to the additional knowhow they are able to glean from their
proximal same-brand outlets. Overall, performance of franchisee-owned and
franchisor-owned outlets is likely to vary, and this variation may have a significant
impact on the franchise system performance in the presence of clustering and growth.
As yet, however, there has been no rigorous assessment of how individual outlet
performance may vary by governance – ownership-based governance or shared
ownership – in presence of growth and clustering.

1.4) Geography
Geographic proximity3 – the physical nearness of outlets – has a strong connection
with franchise system growth. The primary obstacle to firm growth is the inability of
firms’ systems and routines to keep up with the ever-increasing demands imposed by
rapid growth (Jargon 2015; Penrose 1959). Franchisors pursuing a growth strategy
must ensure that each of its franchisees follow operating procedures completely, so as
to ensure uniformity of the product offering across all markets served (Bradach
1997). The more far-flung the outlets, the greater the cost of monitoring them
(Brickley and Dark 1987), and the lesser the franchisors’ ability to ensure compliance
with established operating procedures. The proximity of same-brand outlets provides
a monitoring efficiency to franchisors as well as provides an opportunity for
knowledge transfer between outlets (Lu and Wedig 2013). The extent of the
proximity of outlets therefore may have important performance implications for the

3

In this research, I measure proximity in terms of distance. To account for regional variances, I include
market-specific control variables, such as population, area, income in my empirical specification.
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franchise system. However, prior research on the consequences of proximity has
yielded conflicting results.

On the one hand, proximity is known to induce richer, more frequent interactions
(Ganesan, Malter, and Rindfleisch 2005), thereby facilitating the learning and the transfer
of relevant operating knowledge among same-brand outlets (Kalnins and Mayer 2004).
Argote and Miron-Spektor (2011, p.1124) define organizational learning as “…a change
in the organization’s knowledge that occurs as a function of experience.” Such
knowledge includes but is not limited to technical skills, product- and service process-,
and local market-specific knowledge (Ho and Ganesan 2013; Kalnins and Mayer 2004).
Knowledge acquisition might occur directly via the firm’s own operating experience (i.e.,
knowledge creation) and/or indirectly by knowledge transfer from other firms’
experience, and is continuous. Whether newly established or mature, outlets of the
franchise system gain from learning from each other about their operating environment,
acquiring product- and process-related knowhow, and sharing relevant and useful
operating procedures and practices (Bradach 1997; Shane 2005). Due to this greater
interaction, learning, and knowledge transfer, deviations from standard operating
procedure become known more easily and peer pressure serves to reduce its incidence
(Lafontaine and Slade 2007).

On the other hand, the prospect of intrabrand competition due to proximity
simultaneously poses a daunting and real threat (Kalnins 2004; Pancras, Sriram, and
Kumar 2012). Specifically, proximally located same-brand outlets are competitors
with similar traits and are greater threats to one other (Baum and Mezias 1992).
Greater physical distance between same-brand outlets is therefore recommended to
avoid sales cannibalization (Kalnins 2004; Pancras, Sriram and Kumar 2012). Extant
literature on proximity-related consequences is thus divided, with some scholars
focusing on the positive performance effects of proximity, and others warning of its
ill effects.
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Although useful to the aim of grounding the assessment in a relevant and rigorous
theoretical context, the exclusive reliance on one or the other theoretical perspective does
not allow for the possibility that both positive and negative effects might obtain. As well,
prior research has focused for the most part on the physical proximity (i.e., the
geographic distance to the nearest neighbor or to others within the cluster) of same-brand
outlets. The emphasis on physical nearness assumes geographic distance to be the sole
determinant of outlet performance and ignores important factors that may significantly
temper this relationship at the individual outlet- and the system-level, in particular,
knowledge transfer.

This dissertation comprises two essays. A brief overview of each essay and the research
question it answers, follows.

1.5) Essay 1: Overview and Research Question

Franchising has always relied on a strident growth narrative, yet evidence regarding the
consequences of franchise system growth remains elusive. Whereas high system growth
is lauded and actively sought, unfettered expansion may severely strain franchisors’
ability to maintain system standards and reduce franchisee motivation to remain in
compliance with their contractual obligations, likely resulting in higher terminations by
franchisors. The present study assesses the relational (franchisor terminations) and
financial (system sales and profits) consequences of franchise system growth. Our
analysis of nearly 25,000 observations on 75 franchise systems across all 50 US states
over up to 12 years relates growth in terms of a smoothed (up to 5-year) moving average
of change in the number of outlets to franchisors' terminations of their franchisees. We
synthesize insights from agency theory with research on governance (ownership and
royalty rate) and clustering-based perspectives to assess the moderating role played by
ownership-based governance, royalty rate, and clustering in the growth-franchisor
terminations relationship. The sales- and profitability-related financial consequences of
terminations are also assessed. Overall, essay 1 seeks to address the following question:
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Research Question 1: How does franchise system growth impact franchisor terminations
and consequently, its financial performance?

1.6) Essay 2: Overview and Research Question

As franchise systems expand, the clustering and resulting proximity of same-brand
outlets often become a contentious issue. The increased interactions among outlets may
facilitate knowledge transfer, even while inducing intra-brand competition. Prior research
has considered each possibility − knowledge transfer or intra-brand competition − in
isolation, resulting in conflicting recommendations to the central question: should
multiple same-brand outlets be clustered with or distant from one another? The present
study takes the perspective of the focal outlet, and emphasizes that the opportunity to
share knowledge afforded by clustering-based proximity may or may not be realized,
depending on the motivation and ability of the clustered outlets to transfer and absorb
knowledge, and on the governance context. Our analysis of more than 8,000 observations
on the 988 outlets of a US-based automotive service franchise system from 1977 to 2012,
and corresponding outlet-level sales information from 2004 to 2012 provides support for
our conceptual framework. In sum, essay 2 addresses the following question:
Research Question 2: How does a franchise system’s evolving growth pattern
(clustering) impact the individual outlets’ performance?

1.7) Insights and Anticipated Contributions

This research makes at least three contributions to what is known about franchise system
growth, governance, and geography. First, I synthesize the well-established theoretical
perspectives of agency theory, clustering theory, intrabrand competition, and governance
to provide a better understanding of franchise system growth and its performance
consequences. Instead of using the year-over-year perspective of growth, this research
provides a holistic view of growth by adopting a growth trend perspective that provides a
growth pattern over multiple years, which is less prone to fluctuations.
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Second, I assess the likely moderating impact of governance on franchise system growth
and geographic decisions. Franchisors may rely on their own outlets and franchise others
in a certain proportion. With the passage of time, franchisors may decide to persist with
this proportion or change it by relying on self- and franchisee-owned outlets in current
and new geographic markets. Thus, governance form may have some important
implications for franchise system performance. This study attempts to assess the
moderating impact of governance form in this growth, geography, and performance
relationship. Specifically, my research assesses the moderating effect of ownership-based
governance at the individual market-level on franchise system growth-performance
relationship (Essay 1). I hypothesize that a greater proportion of franchisor-owned outlets
at the individual market-level decreases the likelihood of franchisor terminations of
franchisees. As well, my research investigates the tempering effect of governance context
on the clustering-performance relationship at the individual outlet-level (Essay 2). I
expect that shared ownership of same-brand outlets (e.g., multi-unit franchisees)
enhances the motivation of clustered outlets to transfer knowledge and dampens the intrabrand competitive effects. Further, I hypothesize that franchisee-owned outlets perform
less well when clustered relative to franchisor-owned outlets as they likely face greater
intra-brand competition and gain less from knowledge transfer.

Finally, this research investigates the performance implications of clustering at the
individual outlet-level. I extend the notion of clustering past its exclusive focus on how
geographically close the outlets within a cluster are to the specific identities of the focal
outlet and those proximal to it, and demonstrate that the impact of clustering on
performance is contingent on outlets’ experience and the governance context.
In what follows, I present essay 1 (Franchise System Growth and Franchisors’
Relationship Termination Behavior) and essay 2 (Clustering, Governance, and Individual
Outlet Sales: A Multi-Year Analysis of an Evolving Franchise System) in the form of
chapter 2 and chapter 3 respectively. In each essay, I first develop the theoretical
underpinnings via a proposed conceptual framework, and then discuss the individual
hypotheses linking explanatory variables of interest to performance outcomes. This is
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followed by a description of the research method, results, and their implications. Chapter
4 concludes my dissertation with a discussion of the points of commonality and
differentiation of my essays, the implications arising from both essays taken as a whole,
the limitations of my endeavors, and possible future research directions.
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FIGURE 1
OWNERSHIP-BASED GOVERNANCE OF KFC
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Chapter 2
Franchise System Growth and Franchisors’ Relationship
Termination Behavior
(Resubmitted to Journal of Marketing Research)

Over the last decade, the well-known quick service restaurant chain Subway has
aggressively expanded its retail footprint – the total number of outlets operated – opening
up to 1,200 outlets per year. This strident growth has not come without any problems,
though. In August 2015, Subway experienced its first year of declining sales in over a
decade. “Franchisees are frustrated…and perceptions of Subway’s food
quality…[are]…slipping” (Jargon 2015) as they shirk on their performance obligations in
response to the perceived threat of intra-brand competition induced by the ramp-up in
footprint. In a bid to maintain system standards, Subway has stepped up its terminations
(Shane 1998) of non-compliant franchisees. Franchisors’ dependence on gross revenuebased royalties and the need to attract strong franchisee partners create compelling
incentives to grow the franchise system (Kaufmann and Rangan 1990); 4 their expansion
efforts, however, are greeted with suspicion and frequently with outright hostility by their
existing franchisees. The question that naturally arises is: What are the relational and
financial consequences of franchise system growth?

Although efforts to better understand franchise system growth have been plentiful and
long standing (Fan, Kühn, and Lafontaine 2013; Kaufman and Dant 1996; Norton 1988;
Shane 1996; Shane, Shankar, and Arvindakshan 2006), our examination of prior research
fails to provide a definitive answer on the issue of growth-attributable performance for at
least three reasons. First, the overwhelming focus of extant research has been on
identifying the drivers of outlet growth (see Kaufman and Rangan 1990 and Srinivasan,
Sridhar, Narayanan, and Sihi 2013 for notable exceptions), emphasizing growth as an end
We use the terms “franchise system” and “system” interchangeably to refer to the total number of outlets,
whether franchisee- or franchisor-owned, across all markets (in the present context, US states) the franchise
brand operates in.
4
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in itself. Such a single-minded focus on growth for growth’s sake ignores the deleterious
effects of the intra-brand competition that might attend such growth (Pancras, Sriram, and
Kumar 2012), and that firms may be hard-pressed to manage the increasing growthattendant complexities (Penrose 1959). Subway’s ongoing troubles with its franchisees
represent but one recent example of growth-attributable pains.

A second limitation of extant research on growth pertains to its emphasis on year-overyear (YOY) growth differentials. The benefit of such an approach is the relative ease with
which growth (i.e., increases or decreases relative to a base) may be inferred. Its prime
disadvantage, however, lies in what DeKinder and Kohli (2008, p.84) refer to as the
“…‘point signal’ – information about a firm at a single point in time…” and the resulting
“…incomplete picture…” it provides (ibid.). Interested observers, whether they be
potential or current franchisees or investors, are more apt to value the “flow signals”
(ibid.) inherent in the long-term trend characterizing growth, and to discount the
fluctuations attendant to YOY growth considerations. Yet, to the best of our knowledge,
there has been no attempt made to rigorously discern the long term trends with respect to
growth. The absence of such an effort represents a significant obstacle to gaining a more
complete understanding of growth-related performance effects.

A third gap in our understanding of growth-attributable performance outcomes lies in the
inadequate attention paid to how such growth occurs. By definition, an increasing retail
footprint results in a “spread” of the markets covered, and a corresponding increase in the
costs of communicating and coordinating far flung outlets (Brickley and Dark 1987). At
least three mechanisms have been identified as potential solutions to this coordination
problem: establishing franchisor-owned outlets (i.e., ownership-based governance)
(Brickley and Dark 1987), increasing franchisor incentives to maintain quality (i.e.,
royalty rate) (Lal 1990), and clustering outlets (Lu and Wedig 2013). Notwithstanding
recent theoretical developments (Bell, Tracey, and Heide 2009; Tracey, Heide, and Bell
2014) that point to an intriguing interplay between the geographic proximity inherent to
clustering of outlets and the governance thereof, an empirical assessment of the interplay
of growth, governance, and geography as yet awaits.
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The present study, undertaken in the context of US business format franchising,
represents an attempt to address each of the preceding limitations. Specifically, we posit
the extent and nature of franchise systems’ growth to cause variations in (a) franchisees’
incentives to comply with performance obligations, and (b) franchisors’ ability and
motivation to take action against non-compliant franchisees (i.e., terminate agreements
with existing franchisees) – what we refer to as franchisor terminations. We rely on a
unique dataset of more than 25,000 observations on 75 franchise systems across 50 US
states over up to 12 years, relating growth trends in terms of change in the number of
outlets to observed franchisors’ terminations of franchisees (i.e., relational consequences)
and their sales and profitability-related implications (i.e., financial consequences).

In doing so, we make three key contributions to our understanding of franchise system
growth and its consequences. First, we synthesize agency theory with research on
governance (ownership and royalty rate) and clustering of outlets to provide a more
complete understanding of the termination-related consequences of franchise system
growth (Antia and Frazier 2001). To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first attempt to
relate franchise system growth to variations in franchisors’ terminations of franchisees
and their corresponding system-wide financial consequences.

Second, we build upon and extend the year-over-year perspective adopted by prior
growth-related inquiries to the growth trend displayed by each franchise system over a
multi-year observation window. By describing franchise system growth in terms of a
smoothed (up to 5-year) moving average of change in number of outlets, we
accommodate a wide array of variations in franchise systems’ developing retail footprints
over time even while providing a holistic view of growth (see, for example, related work
by DeKinder and Kohli 2008, and Palmatier, Houston, Dant, and Grewal 2013). We then
investigate the impact of these growth trends on franchisor terminations.

Third, our theoretical framework and empirical analysis focus not only on how much but
also how franchise systems grow, and their performance outcomes. We take as our
starting point the classic growth-limiting problems of communication and coordination

22

challenges (Brickley and Dark 1987) and resource constraints (Penrose 1955; 1959),
which likely enhance franchisees’ propensity to shirk. Franchisor terminations are
therefore likely to go up due to greater instances of non-compliance. We build on prior
theoretical and empirical work emphasizing the role played by ownership-based
governance, royalty rate, and clustering of outlets in affecting the growth-terminations
relationship.

In the section that follows, we first develop the theoretical underpinnings of our
integrative conceptual framework and elicit the individual hypotheses linking franchise
system growth to franchisor terminations. This is followed by a description of the
research method, results, and their implications. We conclude with the limitations of our
study and possible future research directions.

Background

The success of the franchise business model rests on agents’ (franchisees’)
compliance with the contractual terms offered by the principal (franchisor) (Antia and
Frazier 2001), which is in turn dependent on the self-enforcing nature of these terms
(Klein 1996; Lafontaine and Slade 2007; Telser 1960). Figure 1 represents our
conceptual framework. Specifically, franchise agreements are said to be selfenforcing when franchisees are incentivized to comply with their performance
obligations via a combination of a positive stream of rents accruing from their efforts
(Bercovitz 2003) and the credible threat of being cut off from this stream of rents
(i.e., terminated by the franchisor) if found to be shirking or otherwise non-compliant
with the agreed to terms. Any franchisee-perceived reduction in the anticipated
stream of rents and/or in the credible threat of franchisors’ termination of errant
franchisees is likely to elicit franchisee shirking, in turn eroding the self-enforcing
nature of the franchise agreement (Klein 1995) and increasing franchisors’
enforcement efforts (i.e., greater terminations).
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We relate franchise system growth in each market – the increase in that market in the
number of outlets operating under the franchised brand – to the system-wide (i.e.,
across markets) incidence of termination by franchisors of their franchisees. In the
section that follows, we elicit the likely impact of franchise system growth on both
the franchisees’ anticipated stream of rents as well as their perceptions of the credible
threat of franchisor termination. We first hypothesize the likely impact of the extent
of growth in the number of outlets on the self-enforcing nature of the franchise
agreement; this is followed by a discussion of how the nature of such growth –
specifically, franchisors’ reliance on ownership-based governance, royalty rate, and
clustering – might “shift” (Shane 1996) franchisee perceptions of the anticipated
stream of rents and/or the credible threat of franchisor termination, in turn varying the
franchisee incentive to indulge in shirking and the observed franchisor terminations.

Two points are worth noting in our proposed framework. First, although the
franchisor’s termination of an individual franchisee and the consequent dissolution of
the particular relationship is an off-equilibrium occurrence (i.e., the particular dyadic
relationship has deviated from “steady state” conditions), the system-wide incidence
of franchisors terminating franchisees is not at all atypical (Antia and Frazier 2001).
A well-functioning franchise system requires the jettisoning of non-compliant
franchisees (Brickley, Dark, and Weisbach 1991), making terminations a necessary
and not uncommon franchisor practice. It is this system-wide extent of franchisor
terminations upon which our interest focuses.

Second, and similar to the well-known notion of power being inferred from not
needing to exercise it (Frazier and Summers 1984; Gaski 1984), self-enforcing
agreements minimize the need for franchisor terminations as franchisees are
incentivized by the stream of rents and the credible threat of their cessation to comply
with their performance obligations (Antia and Frazier 2001; Klein 1995; Mathewson
and Winter 1985). We rely on this well-theorized inverse association (Gaski 1984;
Gaski and Nevin 1985) to attribute variations in observed system-wide franchisor
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terminations to franchise system growth, and assess its implications for the extent to
which the franchise agreement is self-enforcing.

Hypotheses
Extent of franchise system growth and terminations. We anticipate a direct positive
association between growth in the number of outlets and franchisor terminations. We
attribute this to the combination of a decrease in franchisees’ anticipated stream of
rents as well as in franchisors’ monitoring and enforcement capabilities, each the
attendant outcome of greater growth. As the number of outlets in a market increases,
the prospect of intra-brand competition increases (Pancras, Sriram, and Kumar 2012).
The addition of each new outlet increases the probability of a franchisee competing
for sales with one or more same-branded outlets (Jargon 2015), and the resulting
dilution of franchisees’ stream of rents (Kalnins 2004).
As well, rapid growth in a market places undue stress on the franchisor’s monitoring
and enforcement capabilities (Shane 1996). In particular, the communication and
coordination challenges for franchisors increase significantly in the wake of rapid
growth and strains their financial and managerial resources (Eisenhardt 1988; Penrose
1959; Shane 1996). The result is a significant erosion of the franchisor’s credible
threat of termination, as the franchisor’s ability to monitor its franchisees and respond
to their shirking with appropriate corrective action is compromised.

Together, the decrease in anticipated rents and in the franchisor ability to monitor its
fast growing number of franchisees pose a double jeopardy. Faced with the daunting
prospect of intra-brand competition and a simultaneous reduced likelihood of
franchisor monitoring, franchisees are likely to shirk on their quality inputs (Bergen,
Dutta, and Walker 1992) and free ride (Rubin 1990). The egregious and more
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frequent violations lead to a higher likely incidence of franchisor terminations (Antia
and Frazier 2001).5 We therefore expect that:
H1: The greater the growth of the franchise system, the greater the number of
franchisor terminations.
Shifting the Self-Enforcement Calculus

Thus far, our focus has been on the direct effect of the extent (i.e., the magnitude) of
franchise system growth on franchisor terminations, ceteris paribus. We now shift
our attention from how much to how such growth might occur. Specifically, we assess
how each of three commonly deployed franchisor mechanisms – ownership based
governance, the royalty rate, and clustering – might serve to “shift” franchisees’ selfenforcement calculus.

Ownership-based governance. Ownership-based governance reflects the extent to
which the franchisor owns and operates outlets in the franchise system. Over the last
three decades, a significant body of work in economics, marketing, and management
has identified the drivers (e.g., Dutta, Bergen, Heide, and John 1995; Heide 1994,
2003) of ownership-based governance and its consequences (e.g., Michael 2000;
Srinivasan 2006) alike.

Ownership of outlets provides crucial local market information to franchisors and
helps them set relevant performance benchmarks for franchisees (Bradach 1997;
Dutta et al. 1995). No longer can franchisees lay the blame for inadequate
performance on localized market inequities, as franchisor-owned outlets would be
subject to the same factors. As a result, franchisors are better able to detect shirking
and non-compliance of franchisees (Shane 1998). As well, self-owned outlets provide
5

One might surmise that lower levels of monitoring and the resulting decrease in the likelihood of the
franchisor detecting franchisee non-compliance should lead to a lower number of franchisor terminations
(Antia et al. 2006). Franchisees emboldened to shirk by lower levels of franchisor monitoring, however,
tend to shirk more (Bergen, Dutta, and Walker 1992), leading in turn to increased complaints by other
franchisees and/or customers. The net result is an increase in the number of franchisor terminations as
franchisors respond to these complaints.
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a local market presence to the franchisor resulting in frequent face-to-face
interactions and on-site visits to franchisees (Oxenfeldt and Kelly 1969; Srinivasan
2006), which enhances franchisors’ ability to detect franchisees’ shirking and noncompliance.
Furthermore, having self-owned outlets reduces franchisors’ dependence on their
franchisees. The franchisor may not be as bound by the constraints of maintaining
relationships because it has less incentive to continue such relationships should
franchisees shirk or fail to meet expectations (Lusch and Brown 1996). Moreover, the
franchisor with relatively low dependence may not be as concerned about the
consequences of retaliations to its actions (Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp 1995).
This relative power advantage and lower dependence result in increased credibility of
the franchisor’s threat of terminating noncompliant franchisees (Heide 2003).

Interestingly, the establishment and operation of franchisor-owned outlets in the
vicinity is not solely a threat. Rather, franchisor owned outlets play a significant role
in demonstrating the efficacy of new operational procedures (Judd and Justis 2008),
disseminating new knowhow (Argote 2011), and helping franchisees in these markets
up their capabilities by “selling not telling” (Bradach 1997). The resulting increase in
the franchisees’ anticipated stream of rents is likely to persuade them to comply to a
greater extent (Brickley and Dark 1987).

Together, the increase in the stream of rents and in the credible threat of termination
thus likely strengthen the self-enforcing nature of the franchise agreement, rendering
the need for franchisor terminations lower. The positive association between
franchise system growth and franchisor terminations is likely weakened as franchisors
rely more on ownership-based governance, as both the growth-attributed dilution of
the stream of rents and of the credible threat of termination is countered. Accordingly,

H2: The greater the extent of ownership-based governance, the weaker the
positive association between franchise system growth and franchisor
terminations of franchisees.
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Royalty rate. The typical business format franchise relationship calls for the
franchisee to make ongoing payments to the franchisor and to abide by the latter’s
operational stipulations. In return, the franchisor provides ongoing support to
franchisees, and monitors and enforces quality standards across members of the
franchise system on a continual basis (Lal 1990; Shane 2005). A rich body of prior
work in economics (Gallini and Lutz 1992; Lafontaine 1992), management (Shane
1998; Shane and Foo 1999) and marketing (Agrawal and Lal 1995; Lal 1990)
emphasizes the role of higher royalty rates in motivating franchisors to increase their
monitoring and enforcement efforts.

To the extent that the franchisor receives ongoing royalties, she has an incentive not
to default on her monitoring obligations (Lal 1990; Rubin 1978; Shane 1998). The
royalty rate is directly related to the importance of brand-name investments
(Lafontaine 1992; Lal 1990), and positively affects monitoring frequency (Agrawal
and Lal 1995), in turn enhancing the franchisor’s credible threat of terminating noncompliant franchisees (Lal 1990; Shane and Foo 1999). Franchisees in such well
monitored systems are wary of running afoul of their compliance requirements
(Kashyap, Antia, and Frazier 2012), and more prone to abide with these. In turn, the
greater the compliance of franchisees, the lesser the need for franchisors to undertake
corrective action, i.e., terminate noncompliant franchisees.

Although a higher royalty rate may decrease franchisee motivation to expend their
best efforts on behalf of the brand (Antia, Mani, and Wathne 2017), the increased
monitoring elicited by such high royalty rates is effective in maintaining and
enhancing the value of the franchise brand (Lafontaine 1992; Lal 1990). The likely
increase in franchisees’ anticipated stream of rents is expected to evoke greater
compliance, rendering franchisor terminations unnecessary.

Similar to the effect of ownership based governance, a higher royalty rate strengthens
the self-enforcing nature of the franchise agreement by dissuading franchisees from
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shirking (Rubin 1990). The higher royalty rate confers greater resources on the
franchisors (Shane 1998), who are able to allocate these greater resources to meet the
increased coordination and communication demands attendant to rapid franchise
system growth. Accordingly,
H3: The higher the royalty rate, the weaker the positive association between
franchise system growth and franchisor terminations of franchisees.

Clustering. As franchise systems cluster their outlets, the total cost of monitoring is
spread over a greater number of proximal outlets, thereby reducing the unit cost of
monitoring each outlet and increasing the franchisor’s monitoring ability (Lu and
Wedig 2013). This increased monitoring ability makes it more likely for franchisors
to detect violations and franchisee non-compliance (Brickley and Dark 1987), thereby
increasing the credible threat of termination.

As well, clustering enables the efficient and effective sharing of operating knowhow
among same-brand outlets (Argote and Darr 2000; Argote and Miron-Spektor 2011;
Bradach 1997), thus boosting the anticipated stream of rents for franchisees. We
suggest that greater clustering affords the focal outlet greater opportunities to seek
and acquire knowledge from proximal same-brand outlets while allowing operators of
closely located outlets to observe, meet, and share knowledge with one another with
greater ease (Ganesan, Malter, and Rindfleisch 2005), thereby facilitating the transfer
of relevant operating knowledge among outlets (Kalnins and Mayer 2004).

Together, the increase in the anticipated stream of rents and the credible threat of
termination are likely to dominate the increased risk of intra-brand competition
(Pancras, Sriram, and Kumar 2012) brought about by the clustering of same-brand
outlets and the resulting propensity of franchisees to shirk. As in the case of
ownership-based governance and a higher royalty rate, franchisors’ reliance on
clustering to grow their franchise systems expands the self-enforcing range of the
franchise agreement (Klein 1996). We therefore expect this increased self-enforcing
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range pursuant to clustering to weaken the positive effect of franchise system growth
on terminations. Accordingly,

H4: The greater the clustering of outlets, the weaker the positive association
between franchise system growth and franchisor terminations of franchisees.

Method

Empirical Context and Data Collection Procedure

We assess growth-attributable performance in the context of US-based business format
franchising. In the US, a new franchise business opens every eight minutes, and more
than 900,000 franchise businesses generate over two trillion dollars in economic output
(International Franchise Association 2015). The importance of this sector to the US
economy is thus significant.

Our data collection approach requires following franchise systems’ growth across the
multiple US states they compete in, and assessing its impact on systemwide franchisor
terminations of franchisees over an extended period of time. Our use of multiple sources
of data enables us to collect rich archival information, and check the validity of each data
source where overlapping. Relying on Bond’s Franchise Guide, we sampled randomly
from each of the 11 most popular franchised industries to select a sample of 75 US based
franchise systems for the years 1993 to 2004 inclusive, and obtained information on their
franchising history, royalty rate, and a host of other relevant system-specific information
on an annual basis. For the same sample of 75 franchisors, we also obtained the franchise
disclosure documents (FDD) filed with states’ regulatory authorities for the years 1997,
2000, 2003, and 2004. Each FDD provides information on the current as well as the
preceding two years of the franchisor’s operations. Some FDDs also reported more than
the prior two years of information, thus resulting in an unbalanced dataset of 75 franchise
firms observed over 6 to 12 years from 1993 to 2004.
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Perhaps most important, the FDD provides information on each franchise system’s
presence across each of the 50 US states. We manually transcribed the number of
franchisor- and franchisee-owned outlets for each franchise system in each state and each
year, and are thus able to obtain up to nearly 600 observations per franchise system (i.e.,
50 states x 12 years). The variation in market coverage across the franchise systems
resulted in 25,600 observations in our sample. Table 1 displays the variables used in this
study and their data sources.

Unit of Analysis and Measures
Our unit of analysis is the individual franchise system i (i = 1,….,75) observed in US
state j (j = 1,….,50) in year t (t= 1993,.…., 2004). Our objective is to relate franchise
system growth, ownership-based governance, royalty rate, and clustering to franchisors’
terminations of franchisees. We measure franchisor terminations of franchisees as the
sum of the number of franchisees terminated and not renewed by franchisor i at time t
(FTit).

For each franchise system i, we measure franchise system growth (GRijt) as a smoothed
multi-year (up to 5-year) moving average of change in number of outlets in US state j in
year t. This allows us to elicit a growth trend instead of a year-over-year (YOY) growth
data point which provides information about a firm at a single point in time and is thus
more prone to fluctuations (DeKinder and Kohli 2008). Consistent with prior research
(Lafontaine and Shaw 2005; Srinivasan 2006), we measure ownership-based governance
(OGijt) as the extent to which the franchise system relies on franchisor-owned and
operated outlets, i.e., as the ratio of franchisor-owned outlets to the total number of
outlets for franchise system i in US state j in year t. We measure the royalty rate (RRit) as
the ongoing payment as a percentage of sales that franchisees must pay the franchisor for
their use of the trademark and other support (Agrawal and Lal 1995), and clustering
(CLit) as the concentration of outlets of franchise system i in year t across 50 US states
using the Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI). Prior research has extensively used the
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HHI as a concentration metric (e.g., Feng, Morgan, and Rego 2015; Krasnikov, Mishra,
and Orozco 2009).
Finally, we include several control variables expected to have an impact on franchisors’
terminations of franchisees. We include franchise system age (FAit) – the number of years
elapsed since year of establishment of a franchise system, franchise system size (FSit) –
the number of franchised outlets operated, and initial franchise fee (IFit) − the one-time
fee paid by the franchisee. Further, we include market-specific control variables: market
population (PPjt), per capita income (INCjt), total per capita taxes (TXjt), market GDP
(GDPjt), and market area (ARj). Acknowledging the likely variation in monitoring ability
as a function of distance (Brickley and Dark 1987), we also include distance from
headquarters (DHij), measured using ArcGIS 10.3 as the geodesic distance of the outlets
of franchise system i in focal state j from the capital of the US state where franchise
system i is headquartered. Additionally, we control for each of the 11 industries
represented (INk) and each of the years (YRt) included in our sample, using industry- and
year-specific fixed effects. Table 2A presents the descriptive statistics and correlation
matrix of our sample; Table 2B displays the same information for the untransformed raw
data.

So as to check for the possibility of linear dependencies in the explanatory variables, we
undertook a multicollinearity diagnostic test. The mean variance inflation factor (VIF)
was 3.75. Including polynomials of ownership-based governance, royalty rate and
clustering, the mean variance inflation factor (VIF) rose to 6.83, but remains below 10
(Hair et al. 1995), suggesting that multicollinearity is not a concern.

Model Estimation

To understand the impact of franchise system growth on the termination behavior of the
franchisor, we have to account for multiple complexities. First, we have missing data
with respect to franchisor terminations for some franchise systems and some years, and
need to account for the possibility that these data may not be missing at random.
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Second, our dependent variable (franchisor terminations (FTit) is operationalized at the
franchise system level (group or macro level) and is predicted by independent variables
measured at the same systemwide level (royalty rate (RRit) and clustering (CLit)) as well
as those measured at the US state level (individual or micro level) (franchise system
growth (GRijt) and ownership-based governance (OGijt)). Snijders and Bosker (1999) call
this a micro-macro multilevel situation. A seemingly possible way to obtain good
estimates of the regression parameters in micro-macro situation would involve either
disaggregating or aggregating the data. In the disaggregation approach, individuals
receive scores on a group-level variable by assigning them their group score on that
variable, i.e., all subjects in a particular group receive the same score on the
corresponding individual-level variable, which reduces the variability in the data. In the
aggregation approach, all variables are transformed into variables measured at the group
level by assigning each group its average score on any individual-level variable, which
similar to the disaggregation approach, also reduces the variability in the data yielding
inappropriate estimates of the standard errors of the regression parameters. Therefore,
regression analyses carried out in micro-macro situations most likely result in biased
parameter estimates (Croon and Veldhoven 2007). Modeling the relationship between
variables at different levels is therefore problematic (Croon and Veldhoven 2007).
Without necessary level adjustments, the results may be generalized to an inappropriate
level, because relationships among variables that hold at one level may not necessarily
hold at another level (Snijders and Bosker 1999). It is therefore important to address this
level adjustment bias.
Third, our variables of interest – franchise system growth (GRijt), ownership-based
governance (OGijt), royalty rate (RRit), and clustering (CLit) – are typically strategic
choices rather than random assignments, and hence are potentially endogenous. Our
model specification approach must therefore account for the potential endogeneity of our
regressors. We now describe each stage of our model specification approach in greater
detail.
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Stage 1: Correction for sample-induced endogeneity. So as to account for missing data
with respect to our dependent variable, we specify a Heckman selection equation as
follows:

(1)

INCLUDEit = γ0 + γ1 GRijt + γ2 OGijt + γ3 (OGijt)2 + γ4 RRit + γ5 (RRit)2
+ γ6 CLit + γ7 (CLit)2 + γ8 FAit + γ9 FSit + γ10 IFit + γ11 PPjt
+ γ12 INCjt + γ13 TXjt + γ14 GDPjt + γ15 ARj + γ16 DHij + γ17 MEit
p=38
+ ∑r=28
r=18 γr YRt + ∑p=29 γp INk + εit

Where,
INCLUDEit = Franchise system i’s availability of franchisor terminations information at
time t,
GRijt = Franchise system growth,
OGijt = Ownership-based governance,
RRit = Royalty rate (natural log-transformed),
CLit = Clustering of outlets,
(OGijt)2, (RRit)2, (CLit)2 = Quadratic terms of ownership-based governance, royalty rate,
and clustering, so as to discern potential ceiling effects,
FAit = Franchise system age,
FSit
= Franchise system size (natural log-transformed),
IFit
= Initial franchise fee (natural log-transformed),
PPjt
= Market population (natural log-transformed),
INCjt = Market income (natural log-transformed),
TXjt = Market taxes (natural log-transformed),
GDPjt = Market GDP (natural log-transformed),
ARj = Market area (natural log-transformed),
DHij = Distance from headquarters (natural log-transformed),
MEit = Market experience,
YRt = Year-specific fixed effects,
INk
= Industry-specific fixed effects, and
εit ~ N (μ, σ2).
Following Certo, Busenbark, Woo, and Semadeni’s (2016) guidelines, we include all our
explanatory variables of interest – franchise system growth (GRijt), ownership-based
governance (OGijt), royalty rate (RRit), clustering (CLit) and their polynomials – and control
variables in the selection equation. The role of explanatory variables in the selection
equation is important because the suitability of the Heckman selection model rests on the
significance of both explanatory variables and lambda (Certo, Busenbark, Woo, and
Semadeni 2016). The selection parameter created in this stage, the Inverse Mills Ratio
(IMRit), is then included in the substantive equation estimation.
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Stage 2: Correction for micro-macro level. Our substantive equation estimation
investigates the impact of franchise system growth, ownership-based governance, royalty
rate, and clustering on franchisor terminations of franchisees. We specify our model as:

(2)

FTit = η0 + η1 GRij(t-1) + η2 OGij(t-1) + η3 (OGij(t-1))2 + η4 RRi(t-1) + η5 (RRi(t-1))2
+ η6 CLi(t-1) + η7 (CLi(t-1))2 + η8 GRij(t-1) * OGij(t-1) + η9 GRij(t-1) * RRi(t-1)
+ η10 GRij(t-1) * CLi(t-1) + η11 FAi(t-1) + η12 FSi(t-1) + η13 IFi(t-1) + η14 PPj(t-1)
+ η15 INCj(t-1) + η16 TXj(t-1) + η17 ARj + η18 GDPj(t-1) + η19 DHij
p=41
+ η20 IMRi(t-1) + ∑r=31
r=21 ηr YRt-1 + ∑p=32 ηp INk +uit

Where all terms are as described previously, and
FTit = Count of franchisor terminations (natural log-transformed),
IMRit = Inverse Mills Ratio from Heckman selection model, and
uit
= Random error
We use one-year lagged values of predictors to be more precise on the specific direction
of causality and to reduce the possibility of endogeneity bias due to simultaneity (Sande
and Ghosh 2014). It is clear from Equation 2 that our dependent variable, franchisor
terminations (FTit), is a franchise system level (group or macro level) variable. Two of
our explanatory variables of interest, franchise system growth (GRijt) and ownershipbased governance (OGijt) are the US state level (individual or micro level) variables.
Other variables of interest: clustering (CLit) and royalty rate (RRit) are at the franchise
system level (group or macro level).

Croon and Veldhoven (2007) propose a latent variable-based adjustment of predictors for
analyzing micro-macro data. Their method uses the best linear unbiased predictors of the
group means and yields unbiased estimates of the parameters. As our data also relates to
micro-macro situation, we make level adjustment for our micro variables at the individual
US state level and convert them to macro level at the franchise system level across 50 US
states by using Croon and Veldhoven’s (2007) suggested approach.
Per Equation 2, two micro level explanatory variables of interest need level adjustment –
GRijt and OGijt. Although macro level variables do not require level adjustment, they are
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used in the adjustment procedure for the micro level variables. The level adjustment
procedure includes computing weight matrices W1 and W2, which require estimates of
mean, variance and covariance matrices of micro and macro level variables respectively.
Once computed, weight matrices W1 and W2 help estimate adjusted variables. Following
̃ it (mean = .27, sd = 2.02) and
this procedure, we compute and use adjusted variables 𝐺𝑅
̃ it (mean = .08, sd = .11) in our substantive equation estimation instead of unadjusted
𝑂𝐺
variables GRijt (mean = .29, sd = 4.20) and OGijt (mean = .07, sd = .21) respectively.
Appendix 2A provides more information on Croon and Veldhoven’s (2007) micro-macro
level adjustment procedure. We re-specify our model in Equation 2 with adjusted
variables as follows:
̃ i(t-1) + β2 OG
̃ i(t-1) + β3 (OG
̃ i(t-1))2 + β4 RRi(t-1) + β5 (RRi(t-1))2
(3) FTit = β0 + β1 GR
̃ i(t-1) * OG
̃ i(t-1) + β9 GR
̃ i(t-1) * RRi(t-1) + β10 GR
̃ i(t-1) * CLi(t-1)
+ β6 CLi(t-1) + β7 (CLi(t-1))2 + β8 GR
+ β11 FAi(t-1) + β12 FSi(t-1) + β13 IFi(t-1) + β14 PPj(t-1) + β15 INCj(t-1) + β16 TXj(t-1)
p=41
+ β17 ARj + β18 GDPj(t-1) + β19 DHij + β20 IMRi(t-1) + ∑r=31
r=21 βr YRt-1 + ∑p=32 βp INk + eit
Where all terms are as described previously, and adjusted variables are
̃ it
GR
̃ it
OG

= Franchise system growth (level adjusted), and
= Ownership-based governance (level adjusted)

After level correction, adjusted variables are now at the macro level in line with other
macro level variables in our model. This adjustment eliminates the micro-macro level
discrepancy as well as the potential bias created by it.

Stage 3: Correction for other sources of endogeneity. We account for the endogeneity of
̃ it, 𝑂𝐺
̃ it, RRit, CLit) by relying on the control function approach (Petrin
our regressors (𝐺𝑅
and Train 2010). This approach uses exclusion restrictions to mitigate endogeneity
concerns through a two-step procedure – an auxiliary estimation and then the substantive
equation estimation – and has been used in several prior studies in marketing (Sridhar et
al. 2016; Sridhar and Srinivasan 2012; Wang, Saboo, and Grewal 2015).

First, we perform an auxiliary estimation with the potential endogenous variable as the
dependent variable and include our exgoneous variables as predictors. We include two
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predictor variables as the exclusion restrictions that directly affect the endogenous
regressor but do not affect our ultimate dependent variable. So as to meet the relevance
requirements of a valid exclusion restriction, we rely on the insight that firms are prone to
mimetic isomorphic pressures (DiMaggio and Powell 1983), such that their behavior is
likely to be similar to and drawing from relevant other firms or peer group in their
operating environment. As well, there is no reason to expect that these peers’ past
behavior will directly influence the outcome realized by the focal party. This approach to
create excluded variables has been used in prior marketing studies (e.g., Kumar, Sunder,
and Leone 2014; Sridhar, Germann, Kang, and Grewal 2016). Accordingly, we use oneyear lagged average measures of franchise system growth, ownership-based governance,
royalty rate, and clustering by franchise systems in the same two-digit NAICS code as the
exclusion restrictions. Here, the underlying assumption is that these lagged industry
average measures remain unaffected by firm-level idiosyncratic shocks and cannot
correlate strongly with the residuals in Equation 3 (Lev and Sougiannis 1996). As per
Germann, Ebbes, and Grewal (2015), we paid careful attention to the number of firms
“forming a peer group” (page 9, footnote 9); accordingly, we excluded focal firm from
the peer group and dropped peer groups with fewer than seven firms in our sample.
Additionally, we use firm-specific time-invariant predictor – franchised year fixed (FYRi)
– as another exclusion restriction for each of our endogenous regressors. We measure
franchised year fixed (FYRi) as the number of years elapsed since the year of
establishment of a franchise system i until its first year of observation in our data set. The
firm-specific time-invariant variable is most likely to be associated with our potential
regressors, but is less likely to impact our dependent variable of interest (Antia, Mani,
and Wathne 2017).

To assess the endogeneity of our regressors and the validity of exclusion restrictions, we
conducted several tests. First, we tested whether our proposed endogenous regressors
could be treated as exogenous. This endogeneity test used the difference of two SarganHansen statistics (C statistic), where the test statistic is distributed as a chi-square with
degrees of freedom equal to 1 for each of our endogenous regressors. The test rejects the
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null hypothesis of exogeneity at p < .01 for each of our endogenous regressors. Second,
our F-statistic of excluded instruments in the first stage was above the rule-of-thumb 10
(Staiger and Stock 1997). Third, we used Sargan-Hansen’s J-statistic for the relevancy of
exclusion restrictions. The Sargan-Hansen test is a test of overidentifying restrictions,
where the joint null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid, i.e., uncorrelated with the
error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated
equation. The test fails to reject the null hypothesis. Overall, these tests provide evidence
of the endogeneity of our regressors and the validity of our exclusion restrictions.

Using these exclusion restrictions, we obtain predicted residuals for our four potential
endogenous regressors, which we include as covariates in our substantive equation. Our
final model is:
(4)

̃ i(t-1) + η2 OG
̃ i(t-1) + η3 (OG
̃ i(t-1))2 + η4 RRi(t-1) + η5 (RRi(t-1))2
FTit = η0 + η1 GR
̃ i(t-1) * OG
̃ i(t-1) + η9 GR
̃ i(t-1) * RRi(t-1)
+ η6 CLi(t-1) + η7 (CLi(t-1))2 + η8 GR
̃ i(t-1) * CLi(t-1) + η11 FAi(t-1) + η12 FSi(t-1) + η13 IFi(t-1) + η14 PPj(t-1)
+ η10 GR
+ η15 INCj(t-1) + η16 TXj(t-1) + η17 ARj + η18 GDPj(t-1) + η19 DHij
P=41
+ η20 IMRi(t-1) + ∑r=31
r=21 ηr YRt-1 + ∑p=32 ηp INk
̃ it + δ2 res_OG
̃ it + δ3 res_RRit + δ4 res_CLit + eit
+ δ1 res_GR

Where all terms in our final model are as described previously and δ1-δ4 capture the effect
of the first stage prediction residuals on the dependent variable. We estimate Equation 4
above using a generalized least square (GLS) random-effects panel regression method.

Results

Heckman selection model. Table 3 displays the results of our first-stage Heckman
selection model. The Inverse Mills Ratio is significant (λ = -1.30, p < .01) suggesting a
selection bias, as we expected. The negative lambda coefficient implies that the
unobservable variables in the selection model are negatively correlated with those in the
final (substantive equation) model. We find that franchise systems with greater clustering
are less likely to report franchisor terminations information, but at a diminishing rate (γ6
= -6.09, p < .01; γ7 = 6.03, p < .01). Further, franchise systems with a greater initial
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franchise fee (γ10 = -.04, p < .01) and distance from headquarters (γ16 = -.02, p < .05) are
less likely to provide terminations information. In contrast, older (γ8 = .00, p < .01),
larger (γ9 = .06, p < .01), and more experienced (γ17 = .01, p < .01) franchise systems are
more likely to provide franchisor terminations information. Royalty rate has an inverted
U-shaped relationship (γ4 = -.07, n.s.; γ5 = -.08, p < .01) with the availability of
terminations information. Other factors had no discernible impact on the termination
information selection.

Substantive equation estimation. Table 4 displays the results of the generalized least
square (GLS) random-effects panel regression estimates of three models. We include just
our main variables of interest in Model 1. In Model 2, we also include the control
variables. Model 3 is our full model including all variables of interest, covariates,
interaction terms, and residuals from auxiliary estimation. As is clear from Table 4, these
additions produce significant improvement in model fit (χ2Model 1 = 657.11, p < .01; χ2Model
2

= 3462.49, p < .01; χ2Model 3 = 3832.75, p < .01). Our discussion will focus on Model 3,

i.e., the full model.

The first result to note is that greater franchise system growth significantly increases
franchisor terminations of franchisees (η1 = .31, p < .01). This finding supports
hypothesis H1 which stated that higher growth is likely to be associated with more
terminations.

Although not hypothesized, several interesting results related to the main effects of
ownership-based governance, royalty rate, and clustering are worth noting. An
examination of their estimated coefficients suggests that ownership-based governance is
associated with increasing terminations (η2 = 1.47, p < .01), but subject to a diminishing
rate (η3 = -2.92, p < .05). Royalty rate decreases terminations (η4 = -2.75, p < .01) at a
diminishing rate (η5 = .24, p < .01). An increase in clustering is also associated with a
decrease in number of terminations (η6 = -9.06, p < .01).
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We now turn our attention to the estimates pertaining to how this growth is achieved. Our
second hypothesis H2 predicted a negative effect of the ownership-based governance on
franchise system growth and terminations relationship. This hypothesis would find
support if we were to find a negative association between franchise systems’ reliance on
their own outlets for growth and the number of franchisor terminations. We find
significant support for hypothesis H2. Relying on their own outlets when growing,
franchise systems decrease the incidence of franchisor terminations (η8 = -.83, p < .01).

Hypothesis H3 predicted a negative association between the franchise system growth
reliant on high royalty rate and franchisor terminations of franchisees. This hypothesis
would find support if we were to find a negative association between franchise systems’
reliance on high royalty rate for growth and the number of franchisor terminations. We
find strong support of hypothesis H3. Franchise systems are less likely to terminate
franchisees when they rely on higher royalty rate while they grow (η9 = -.40, p < .01).

Finally, our hypothesis H4 anticipated a decrease in franchisor terminations pursuant to
clustering-reliant system growth. The pairwise interaction involving franchise system
growth and clustering is found significant and negative (η10 = -2.58, p < .01), which
shows that clustering-reliant growth decreases franchisor terminations. We therefore find
support for H4.

With respect to control variables, we find that franchise system age (η11 = .01, p <
.01), franchise system size (η12 = .25, p < .01), and initial franchise fee (η13 = .15, p <
.01) significantly and positively impact the termination incidence. We also find that
the inverse mills ratio (η20 = .79, p < .01) significantly and positively affects
terminations, which suggests that if the selection bias were unaccounted for, the
estimated franchisor terminations would be overstated. Other covariates do not have a
discernable impact on franchisor terminations.
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Post hoc Analyses of Significant Interactions

So as to gain a better understanding of how ownership-based governance, royalty rate,
and clustering temper the relationship between franchise system growth and franchisor
terminations, we conducted a floodlight analysis using the Johnson-Neyman (JN)
procedure (Spiller et al. 2013). Table 7 displays the results corresponding to the
significant two-way interactions and Figure 2 graphs the simple slopes.

For ownership-based governance (OG), the JN lower bound occurs at .12 suggesting the
simple slope of franchise system growth (GR) on terminations (FT) is significant below
this point. The results show that at low levels of ownership-based governance, franchise
systems pursuing growth significantly increase terminations (simple slope of GR under
Low OG = .32, p < .01), and at high levels of ownership-based governance, franchise
systems pursuing growth partially decrease terminations (simple slope of GR under High
OG = -.21, p < .10).

The range of royalty rate (RR) is from 0 to 3.04. The JN lower and upper bounds occur at
.26 and 1.27 respectively, suggesting the simple slope of franchise system growth on
terminations is significant between 0 and .26, and between 1.27 and 3.04. The moderating
effect of royalty rate on franchise system growth and terminations is found significant
and positive at low levels (simple slope of GR under Low RR = .31, p < .01), and
significant and negative at high levels (simple slope of GR under High RR = -.90, p <
.01).

The moderating effect of clustering (CL) on franchise system growth (GR) and
terminations (FT) fares similar to royalty rate. The range of clustering (CL) is from .03 to
1. The JN upper bound of .21 lies within this continuum, suggesting the simple slope of
franchise system growth (GR) on terminations (FT) is significant between the interval .21
to 1. At low levels of clustering, franchise systems pursuing growth significantly increase
the number of franchisor terminations (simple slope of GR under Low CL = .23, p < .05),
and at high levels of clustering, they significantly decrease the number of franchisor
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terminations (simple slope of GR under High CL = -2.27, p < .01). The moderating effect
of clustering on franchise system growth and terminations is therefore significant at both
low and high levels.
Overall, we obtain clear evidence that franchise systems’ reliance on ownership-based
governance, royalty rate, or clustering to fuel their growth significantly and negatively
affects their tendency to terminate franchisees.

Alternate Specifications

We assessed the stability of our findings to alternate estimation approaches, alternate
measures of growth, alternate time-related specifications, and alternative levels of
analysis.

Alternate estimator. In order to test the robustness of our results, we used the randomeffects negative binomial model (RENB). RENB regression fits a random-effects overdispersion model for a count dependent variable. The mean of our raw count dependent
variable (without natural log-transformation) is almost half that of its variance, which
makes the RENB estimation suitable to our purpose. All our results with respect to the
hypothesized effects remain robust to this alternate estimator.

Alternate measures of growth. Instead of a smoothed (up to 5-year) moving average of
growth, we reduced one year and relied on a 4-year smoothed moving average of growth
as an alternate measure. Our random effects panel regression results remain robust to this
alternate measure of growth as well. Further, we assessed the impact of year-over-year
(YOY) franchise system growth on the franchisor terminations. Our results indicate that
YOY growth that relies on ownership-based governance or royalty rate decreases
terminations, but relying on clustering increases terminations. Results from this model
specification therefore exhibit discrepancies with respect to our smoothed 5-year or 4year growth trend models, which bring to light the importance of using a growth trend
instead of YOY growth that is more prone to fluctuations.
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Alternate temporal separation. Our conceptualization and subsequent model specification
approach have proceeded on the assumption of one-year lagged values of explanatory
variables. We also assessed contemporaneous (immediate, within the same year) effects
of predictors on the number of franchisor terminations. All our findings with respect to
tempering effects of ownership-based governance, royalty rate, and clustering on
franchise system growth-terminations relationship remain robust to this alternate
temporal separation.

Alternate level of analysis. We also specified an alternate model by using unadjusted
growth and ownership-based governance variables, i.e., without using Croon and
Veldhoven’s (2007) suggested adjustment approach. The results show that clustering and
royalty rate only partially impact franchise system growth and terminations relationship.
Our decision to adjust micro-level variables as per Croon and Veldhoven’s approach
therefore appears warranted.

The Financial Consequences of Franchisor Terminations

We also assessed the impact of franchisor terminations on two highly relevant
financial outcomes for the franchise system – sales and profitability. Information on
overall franchise system sales revenue (SRit) is obtained on an annual basis from the
FDD; we used the annual financial statements to compute system-wide net profit ratio
(PRit) as the ratio of franchisors’ after tax profit to their net sales.

Both metrics are of immense relevance to franchisors and their key stakeholders alike
(Burkitt 2015; Jargon 2015) as well as to scholars of growth (DeKinder and Kohli
2008; Palmatier et al. 2013). With greater number of franchisor terminations brought
about by greater detection of violations and enforcement, franchisees’ self-motivation
to perform increases (Klein 1980; 1995), in turn leading to lesser shirking, higher
compliance, and quality provision (Bercovitz 2003; Rubin 1990). End-customer
satisfaction with the product offering correspondingly increases (Rust and Oliver
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1994) as does repeat purchase (Taylor and Baker 1994), resulting in higher sales
achieved by the franchise system. The costs associated with the franchisor policing of
franchisee compliance with the agreement are also reduced (Kashyap, Antia, and
Frazier 2012), thereby increasing the profit associated with the achieved sales.
Franchise system sales also matter for franchisors due to their reliance on royalty
payments which are calculated as a percentage of franchisees’ sales, whereas
profitability is important to franchisors to spur further growth and attract new
franchisees.

After accounting for control variables listed in Table 1 and using contemporaneous,
one-year lagged, and two-year lagged models, we find that franchise system sales
suffer immediately as franchisor terminations increase (Coeff. = -.16, p < .01), but
they significantly recover later (Coeff.one-year lag = .21; Coeff.two-year lag = .13, p < .01).
Contrary to sales, we find that profitability improves in the immediate aftermath of
terminations (Coeff. = .97, p < .01), and this improvement persists in later years
(Coeff.one-year lag = .79, p < .01; Coeff.two-year lag = 5.78, p < .05). These results suggest
that pruning of bad franchisees harms franchise system sales in the short run, but
profitability improves as stronger, more compliant, and better performing franchisees
remain in the system.

Discussion

The present study assesses an issue of fundamental importance to firms: How does
franchise system growth impact franchisor terminations, and subsequently, system sales
and profits? Within the context of franchising, characterized as it is by partners’ mutual
reliance on each other, growth-related consequences take on even more importance.
Potential franchisees are advised to “…make sure the franchise has the long-term
viability associated with vibrant growth, but also that it's not growing too fast to manage
the issues associated with this growth” (Elgin 2005). To the best of our knowledge,
however, guidance as to the growth rate appropriate to both the preceding imperatives is
as yet forthcoming. Our analysis of 75 franchise systems observed over up to 12 years as
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they increase their retail footprint across all 50 US states provides just such guidance. We
hypothesize and find evidence of the interplay of growth, governance (ownership and
royalty rate), and geography (clustering) significantly shifting the impact of growth on
firms’ financial outcomes via the inducement of franchisee compliance, i.e., the strength
of the self-enforcement mechanism. Our synthesis of three well-established theoretical
perspectives – agency theory, governance, and clustering – extends our understanding of
growth beyond its current emphasis on how much to how such growth might occur.
Likely because “hard” information on actual behaviors and financial outcomes is so
difficult to collect for non-publicly held firms, prior research has tended to focus on
franchisee compliance and perceptions, either self-reported (Kashyap, Antia, and Frazier
2012) or as reported by the franchisor (Antia and Frazier 2001). Relying on regulationrequired disclosure documents, the present research establishes a clear linkage between
actual franchisor terminations and franchise system sales and profits. Our work provides
much needed evidence of franchisor behavior-attributable performance outcomes.

We find that, by itself, growth in the number of outlets in each market the system
operates in is associated with a significant increase in the number of franchisor
terminations system-wide. This positive association, however, is not necessarily a bad
outcome. Consistent with anecdotal (yet hitherto untested) claims that franchisor
terminations help weed out “the bad eggs” (i.e., noncompliant franchisees), we do find
that in the aftermath of such terminations (i.e., up to the two-year duration we tested for),
terminations result in increased system-wide sales and profits. We attribute these positive
effects of termination to the system-wide signal of franchisor commitment to system
integrity they represent (Antia and Frazier 2001), and their corresponding franchisee
effort-eliciting impact (Agrawal and Lal 1995). The contemporaneous yet short-lived
negative effect of franchisor terminations on sales is a small price to pay for longer-term
system integrity, particularly keeping in mind the immediate and positive gain in systemwide profits.
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Findings from our study suggest that in addition to the extent of growth, how such growth
occurs is of critical importance. We find evidence that franchisors’ reliance on
ownership-based governance, higher royalty rates, and clustering of its outlets each aid in
strengthening the self-enforcement mechanism. This is manifest in a weakening of the
positive association between system-wide growth and franchisor terminations. Each of
the preceding three mechanisms serves the purpose of increasing the franchisees’
anticipated stream of rents and/or the credible threat of their termination by the
franchisor, thereby increasing the self-enforcing range of the franchise agreement. Just as
power resides in a reduced necessity for its exercise (Frazier 1983), so do the selfenforcing terms result in lower observed terminations system-wide.

Ownership-based governance and the simultaneous reliance on own and partner inputs
that it implies enjoy a time-honored status as an effective governance mechanism (Dutta
et al. 1995; Heide 2003; Monteverde and Teece 1982). Our work builds on this
foundation, and finds that franchisors’ reliance on this mechanism when growing its retail
footprint increases the strength of the self-enforcement mechanism; the number of
franchisor terminations falls, consistent with the notion that ownership-based governance
reduces the information asymmetry between the franchisor and its franchisees, and serves
as a credible threat (Heide 2003).

Our findings with respect to the effect of a higher royalty rate under conditions of high
growth are also worth discussing. Consistent with prior research (Lafontaine l992; Lal
1990), we do find evidence consistent with the notion that the royalty rate motivates
franchisors’ monitoring and system integrity-maintaining efforts, thereby increasing the
credible threat of termination and correspondingly increasing the self-enforcing range of
the franchise agreement. The result is a significant weakening of the positive growthtermination association. As well, albeit not hypothesized by us, the higher the royalty
rate, the lower the observed franchisor terminations; beyond a point, however, raising the
royalty rate further is counter-productive, as evidenced by the uptick in franchisor
terminations (i.e., the quadratic term is positive and significant). Together, these findings
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underscore the careful balance franchisors must strike when determining the appropriate
royalty rate their franchisees must pay them.

The assessment of clustering effects that we offer confirms empirically the insights
offered by the nascent literature in marketing on the impact of geography (Bell, Tracey,
and Heide 2009; Mittal, Kamakura, and Govind 2004; Tracey, Heide, and Bell 2014).
The clustering of outlets is found to significantly strengthen the self-enforcement
mechanism when growing the retail footprint. Further probing of the simple slopes of
growth on franchisor terminations helps better understand its effect on the growthterminations association. As can be seen Figure 2 (third panel), growth in the number of
outlets, when accompanied by a clustering-induced “critical mass” of outlets, is
associated with a strengthened self-enforcement mechanism; in marked contrast, growth
that relies on a lower level of clustering does not have any impact on the strength of selfenforcement mechanism. It thus appears that the combination of high growth and
clustering increases the self-enforcing range of the franchise agreement, and reduces the
necessity for franchisor terminations.

Limitations and Future Research Directions
As with any research, the present study is subject to some limitations. First, our reliance
on longitudinal archival data, while affording rich insights into actual rather than reported
behavior, cannot speak to the motivations underlying such behavior. All we can state is
that the observed behavior patterns are not inconsistent with our hypothesized effects.
Future work that synthesizes insights from archival and survey-collected micro-data,
although difficult to conduct, would be very welcome. Second, the present study relates
market- and system-level hypothesized predictors to the strength of the self-enforcement
mechanism and subsequent financial outcomes at the system level. An assessment of
market-level intermediate (e.g., terminations at market level) or final-stage outcomes
would be a promising avenue for future research. Third, the data at hand precludes the
ability to identify the specific location (street address and zip code) of individual outlets,
whether franchisor- or franchisee-owned and operated. Such information, if available,
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would provide rich insights on proximity-induced intra- and inter-brand competitive
effects.
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TABLE 1
VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES
Construct

Measure

Notation

Data Source

Franchisor Terminations

The count of franchisor terminations of
franchisees for franchise system i in year t

FTit

Franchise Disclosure Documents

Franchise System
Growth

A smoothed multi-year moving average (up
to 5-year) of change in number of outlets

GRijt

Bond’s Franchise Guide
(Computed from annual number of
outlets in each US state)

OGijt

Bond’s Franchise Guide

RRit

Bond’s Franchise Guide

CLit

Bond’s Franchise Guide
(Computed from annual number of
outlets in each US state)

FAit

Bond’s Franchise Guide

FSit

Bond’s Franchise Guide

IFit

Bond’s Franchise Guide

Population of state j in year t

PPjt

US Census Bureau

Income per capita in state j in year t
Total state per capita taxes paid in state j in
year t
GDP of state j in year t

INCjt

Bureau of Economic Analysis

TXjt

Bureau of Economic Analysis

GDPjt

Bureau of Economic Analysis

ARj

US Census Bureau

DHij

Computed variable using ArcGIS

MEit

Bond’s Franchise Guide

Ownership-Based
Governance
Royalty Rate
Clustering

Ratio of franchisor-owned outlets to the
total number of outlets for franchise system
i in US state j in year t
The ongoing payment as a percentage of
sales in of franchise system i in year t
Concentration of outlets of franchise system
i in year t as measured by the HirschmanHerfindahl Index (HHI)

Control Variables
Franchise System Age
Franchise System Size
Initial Franchise Fee
Market Population
(millions)
Income (millions)
Market Taxes
Market GDP (millions)
Market Area (square
miles)
Distance from
Headquarters (miles)
Market Experience

Number of years elapsed since year of
establishment of franchise system i in year t
Number of franchised outlets operated by
franchise system i in year t
The one-time fee paid by new franchisees in
year t

Area of state j
The geodesic distance of the outlets of
franchise system i in state j from the capital
of the US state where firm i is
headquartered
Count of US states in which franchise
system i is present in year t
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TABLE 2A
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATION MATRIX
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

a

2

Franchisor Terminations
Franchise System Growth

FTit
GRijt

-0.02

-

3

Ownership-Based Governance

OGijt

-0.06

-0.01

-

4

a

Royalty Rate

RRit

-0.05

0.00

-0.03

-

5

Clustering

CLit

-0.10

-0.03

-0.10

-0.05

-

6

Franchise System Age

FAit

0.22

0.03

0.08

-0.02

-0.17

-

7

a

Franchise System Size

FSit

0.39

0.10

-0.03

0.17

-0.57

0.33

-

8

a

Initial Franchise Fee

IFit

-0.21

-0.01

0.07

0.15

0.01

-0.01

-0.08

-

9

a

Market Population

PPjt

0.00

0.04

0.12

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.01

0.00

-

10

a

Income (per capita)

INCjt

0.02

0.02

0.03

0.03

-0.03

0.04

0.06

0.02

0.26

-

11

a

Market Taxes

TXjt

0.01

0.01

0.06

0.01

-0.01

0.02

0.03

0.01

0.37

0.75

-

12

a

Market GDP

GDPjt

0.01

0.05

0.13

0.01

-0.01

0.02

0.02

0.01

0.95

0.41

0.47

-

13

a

Market Area

ARj

0.00

0.02

0.01

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.18

-0.26

-0.47

0.13

14

a

Distance from Headquarters

DHij

1

13

14

-

-

0.01

-0.03

-0.11

0.01

0.00

-0.01

0.02

0.01

-0.17

0.03

-0.02

-0.16

0.02

-

Mean

1.75

0.29

0.07

1.73

0.16

25.49

5.00

9.68

15.03

10.53

8.16

11.60

10.75

7.10

SD

1.38

4.20

0.21

0.53

0.19

12.98

1.78

1.80

1.05

0.16

0.23

1.06

1.10

1.24

n1= 25,600
Correlations exceeding |.01| are significant at p < .05, two-tailed
a: Natural log-transformed
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TABLE 2B
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATION MATRIX (RAW VALUES)
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

1

Franchisor Terminations

FTit

1.00

2

Franchise System Growth

GRijt

0.00

1.00

3

Ownership-Based Governance

OGijt

-0.08

-0.01

1.00

4

Royalty Rate

RRit

0.27

0.00

-0.07

1.00

5

Clustering

CLit

-0.05

-0.03

-0.10

-0.09

1.00

6

Franchise System Age

FAit

0.13

0.03

0.08

0.05

-0.17

1.00

7

Franchise System Size

FSit

0.36

0.14

0.03

0.28

-0.27

0.38

1.00

8

Initial Franchise Fee

IFit

-0.15

-0.04

0.12

-0.08

0.07

-0.09

-0.14

1.00

9

Market Population

PPjt

0.00

0.05

0.09

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.00

10

Income (per capita)

INCjt

0.03

0.02

0.03

0.03

-0.03

0.04

0.02

0.02

0.27

1.00

11

Market Taxes

TXjt

0.01

0.01

0.05

0.01

-0.01

0.02

0.01

0.01

0.31

0.80

1.00

12

Market GDP

GDPjt

0.01

0.05

0.08

0.01

-0.01

0.01

0.01

0.01

0.98

0.36

0.39

1.00

13

Market Area

ARj

0.00

0.01

-0.03

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.10

-0.02

-0.36

0.09

1.00

14

Distance from Headquarters

DHij

0.02

-0.01

-0.07

0.06

-0.01

-0.02

0.04

0.03

-0.06

0.13

0.04

-0.04

0.22

1.00

3603

0.19

b

75902

1733

0.23

b

96099

1242

Mean
SD

14.54
27.66

0.29
4.20

0.07
0.21

n1= 25,600
Correlations exceeding |.01| are significant at p < .05, two-tailed
b: Millions

5.33
2.88

0.16
0.19

25.49
12.98

501.6
901.4

24620
12732

5.55

b

6.07

b

37892
6330

880
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TABLE 3
HECKMAN SELECTION MODEL ESTIMATES
bInclude

Intercept
Franchise System Growth
Ownership-Based
Governance
a

Royalty Rate

Clustering
Franchise System Age
a
Franchise System Size
a
Initial Franchise Fee
a
Market Population
a
Income (per capita)
a
Market Taxes
a
Market GDP
a
Market Area
a
Distance from Headquarters
Market Experience
Year Fixed Effects
Industry Fixed Effects
Inverse Mills Ratio
Lambda

Notation

Coefficient

γ0
γ1
γ2

GRijt
OGijt

1.05
.00
-.37

γ3

(OGijt)2

.38

γ4
γ5
γ6
γ7
γ8
γ9
γ10
γ11
γ12
γ13
γ14
γ15
γ16
γ17
γ18-28
γ29-38

RRit
(RRit)2
CLit
(CLit)2
FAit
FSit
IFit
PPjt
INCjt
TXjt
GDPjt
ARj
DHij
MEit
YRt
INk

Λ

Standard
Error
.99
.00
.21

z value
1.07
.89
-1.78

.23

1.60

-.07
-.08**
-6.09**
6.03**
.00**
.06**
-.04**
-.00
.02
-.00
-.00
.00
-.02*
.01**

.07
.03
.30
.31
.00
.01
.00
.04
.11
.09
.04
.01
.01
.00
Yes
Yes

-1.00
-3.14
-20.29
19.45
4.44
4.69
-5.54
-.00
.17
.05
-.07
.25
-2.38
3.17

-1.30**

.18

-7.11

Number of Observations = n1 = 19,950, Wald χ2 = 5892.59 (p < .01)
a: Natural log-transformed
b: Franchise system i’s availability of franchisor terminations information at time t
*p < .05, **p < .01, two-tailed
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TABLE 4
GENERALIZED LEAST SQUARE (GLS) RANDOM-EFFECTS PANEL REGRESSION ESTIMATES
Model 1
Main Effects Only
a

Franchisor Terminations (FTit)

Notation

Coefficient

SE

Model 2
With Control Variables
Coefficient

SE

-.38
-.03**
1.15**
-2.93**
-1.90**
.52**
-6.58**
6.92**

1.28
.01
.38
1.04
.10
.03
.63
.62

.00
.51**
.02
.00
.03
.01
-.01
.00
-.03*
2.17**

.00
.02
.01
.03
.16
.12
.03
.02
.01
.18

Model 3
Full Model
Coefficient

SE

η0
η1
η2
η3
η4
η5
η6
η7
η8
η9
η10
η11
η12
η13
η14
η15
η16
η17
η18
η19
η20
η21-31
η32-41
δ1

̃ i(t-1)
𝐺𝑅
̃ i(t-1)
𝑂𝐺
̃ i(t-1))2
(𝑂𝐺
RRi(t-1)
(RRi(t-1))2
CLi(t-1)
(CLi(t-1))2
̃ i(t-1) * 𝑂𝐺
̃ i(t-1)
𝐺𝑅
̃
𝐺𝑅 i(t-1) * RRi(t-1)
̃ i(t-1) * CLi(t-1)
𝐺𝑅
FAi(t-1)
FSi(t-1)
IFi(t-1)
PPj(t-1)
INCj(t-1)
TXj(t-1)
GDPj(t-1)
ARj
DHij
IMRi(t-1)
YRt-1
INk
̃ i(t-1)
AI_𝐺𝑅

Ownership-Based Governance Residuals

δ2

̃ i(t-1)
AI_𝑂𝐺

-1.24**

.36

Royalty Rate Residuals

δ3

AI_RRi(t-1)

1.54**

.18

Clustering Residuals

δ4

AI_CLi(t-1)

8.05**

1.35

Intercept
Franchise System Growth
Ownership-Based Governance
a

Royalty Rate

Clustering
Franchise System Growth * Ownership-Based Governance
Franchise System Growth * Royalty Rate
Franchise System Growth * Clustering
Franchise System Age
a
Franchise System Size
a
Initial Franchise Fee
a
Market Population
a
Income (per capita)
a
Market Taxes
a
Market GDP
a
Market Area
a
Distance from Headquarters
Inverse Mills Ratio
Year Fixed Effects
Industry Fixed Effects
Franchise System Growth Residuals

3.14**
.02**
.76*
-6.06**
-1.50**
.51**
-3.81**
2.94**

.09
.01
.36
.98
.10
.03
.30
.32

No
No

Wald χ2 = 657.11**
Number of Observations = n2 = 9,517; a: Natural log-transformed; *p < .05, **p < .01, two-tailed

Yes
Yes

Wald χ2 = 3462.49**

3.75**
.31**
1.47**
-2.92*
-2.75**
.24**
-9.06**
1.09
-.83**
-.40**
-2.58**
.01**
.25**
.15**
.00
.00
.01
-.01
.00
-.02
.79**
Yes
Yes
.70**

1.27
.11
.43
1.15
.19
.04
1.61
.75
.08
.03
.32
.00
.08
.02
.03
.14
.12
.03
.02
.01
.21

.10

Wald χ2 = 3832.75**
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TABLE 5
SIMPLE SLOPES ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANT INTERACTIONS
Estimated Impact on
Franchisor Terminations
(Simple Slope)

t-Value

Impact of GR on FT at various levels of OG
OG (Low)
OG (High)

.32**
-.21+

2.87
-1.78

.31**
-.90**

2.83
-8.61

.23*
-2.27**

2.11
-7.32

Impact of GR on FT at various levels of RR
RR (Low)
RR (High)

Impact of GR on FT at various levels of CL
CL (Low)
CL (High)

FT: Franchisor Terminations, GR: Franchise System Growth,
OG: Ownership-Based Governance, RR: Royalty Rate, CL: Clustering
+

p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, two-tailed
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FIGURE 1
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Clustering

Ownership-Based
Governance

Franchise System Growth

Franchisor Terminations

Royalty Rate

Control Variables
• Franchise System Age
• Franchise System Size
• Initial Franchise Fee
• Market Population
• Income
• Market Taxes
• Market GDP
• Market Area
• Distance from the Headquarters
• Year-Specific Fixed Effects
• Industry-Specific Fixed Effects
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FIGURE 2
SIMPLE SLOPES ANALYSIS
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APPENDIX 2A
THE MICRO-MACRO LEVEL ADJUSTMENT PROCEDURE

Croon and Veldhoven (2007) propose a latent variable-based adjustment of predictors for
analyzing micro-macro data, which yields unbiased estimates of the parameters. Their
approach, calls for the adjustment of the micro-level variables by computing weight
matrices W1 and W2, which require estimates of the mean, variance and covariance
matrices of micro and macro level variables. W1 and W2 are p x p and p x q matrices
respectively, where p = number of micro-level variables and q = number of macro-level
variables in the model. W2 will be zero in the absence of macro-level predictor variable in
the model. Once computed, weight matrices W1 and W2 help estimate adjusted variables.
Assuming a micro-macro level relationship that involves a macro-level dependent
variable – terminations across all markets (Y), and a micro-level independent variable at
the individual market-level (Xj) (where j denotes the specific market) and a macro-level
independent variable across all markets (Z).
1)

Y = Xj + Z + e

Where, e = Random error
A seemingly appropriate way to obtain good estimates of the regression parameters in
Equation 1 would consist of aggregating the micro-level scores (Xj) to the macro-level by
determining the group mean (𝑋̅) and then regressing Y on both 𝑋̅ and Z. However, this
aggregated regression analysis will yield unbiased estimates of the regression parameters
only if there is no within-group variability, which is an unrealistic scenario.
The relationship between the micro-level variable and the macro-level (latent) variable
score is given by
2)

Xj = 𝑋̅ + vj

Where,
̅ = The latent macro-level variable, predicted by the mean variable score of Xj,
X
vj = Random error
Per Croon and Veldhoven’s (2007) suggested approach, this mean of the micro-level
predictor (𝑋̅) will be adjusted to the macro-level (𝑋̃). To obtain unbiased estimates of the
regression parameters, we regress Y on 𝑋̃ (instead of 𝑋̅) and Z, i.e.,
3)
Where,

Y = 𝑋̃ + Z + u
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̃
X = The adjusted variable,
u = Random error
The Level-Adjustment Procedure
Croon and Veldhoven (2007) have proposed a three-step procedure to obtain unbiased
parameter estimates in micro-macro level situations.
a) The first step involves the estimation of weight matrices, W1 and W2. The
computation of weight matrices requires the estimates of the mean, variance and
covariance matrices of micro and macro level variables via standard ANOVA
techniques, as follows:
4)

W1 = (𝑆𝑋̅𝑋̅ + 𝑆𝑣𝑣 /nj - 𝑆𝑋̅𝑍 (𝑆𝑋̅𝑋̅ )-1𝑆𝑍𝑋̅ )-1 (𝑆𝑋̅𝑋̅ - 𝑆𝑋̅𝑍 (𝑆𝑋̅𝑋̅ )-1𝑆𝑍𝑋̅ )

5)

W2 = (𝑆𝑍𝑍 )-1 𝑆𝑍𝑋̅ (Ipxp - W1)

Where,
S denotes a covariance matrix,
nj = Number of observations at the micro-level,
I = Identity matrix
b) In the second step, the adjusted predictor is estimated as
6)

𝑋̃ = (𝑋̅)′ (Ipxp - W1) + (𝑋̅)′ W1 + (Z - 𝑍̅)′ W2

c) Finally, a regression analysis of Y on 𝑋̃ and Z is carried out as per Equation 3. The
resulting estimates are unbiased (see Croon and Veldhoven (2007, page 52), for
simulation-based evidence).
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Chapter 3
Clustering, Governance, and Individual Outlet Sales:
A Multi-Year Analysis of an Evolving Franchise System
(Resubmitted to Journal of Marketing on January 6th, 2017)

“Any time you open more and more units, there’s always some impact…People are still making some
money – it’s just not what they used to make.” – Hardy Grewal, Subway’s largest U.S. development agent.
“Subways aren’t cannibalizing each other…restaurants in the most Subway-dense markets actually have
higher average sales.” – Don Fertman, Subway’s chief development officer.

-

The Wall Street Journal, August 15, 2015.

The preceding quotes exemplify the starkly divergent views regarding clustering − the
geographic concentration of interconnected institutions (Porter 1998). On the one hand,
clustering is known to elicit richer, more frequent interactions (Ganesan, Malter, and
Rindfleisch 2005), thereby facilitating the transfer of relevant operating knowledge
among outlets (Kalnins and Mayer 2004). On the other hand, the prospect of proximityinduced intra-brand competition poses a daunting and real threat (Kalnins 2004; Pancras,
Sriram, and Kumar 2012). In light of this, should the multiple same-brand outlets of a
franchise system be clustered with or be distant from one another? For interested
scholars and practitioners alike, the preceding question has profound implications yet
remains largely unanswered.

Table 1 summarizes extant empirical research on the performance-related consequences
of the proximity of same-brand outlets. Scholars working within a sociological tradition
of clustering theory (Ganesan, Malter, and Rindfleisch 2005; Ingram and Baum 1997)
emphasize almost exclusively the proximity-induced opportunities for greater learning,
interaction, and knowledge-sharing among closely located outlets, and the consequent
performance gains for the focal entity participating in such a cluster (Lu and Wedig
2013). The primarily economics-informed perspective on proximity (Kalnins 2004;
Pancras, Sriram, and Kumar 2012), however, emphasizes the costs imposed by the
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resulting intra-brand competition. As evident from Table 1, prior studies have adopted a
knowledge transfer or intra-brand competition-informed viewpoint. As a result, the
intriguing possibility that both perspectives might be valid remains unexplored.

The present study represents the first effort, to the best of our knowledge, to acknowledge
and reconcile these seemingly conflicting effects of proximity. Within the context of a
growing US-based franchise system, we take the perspective of the focal outlet seeking to
leverage knowledge transferred from the proximal same-brand outlets it is clustered with,
even while avoiding the sales cannibalization brought about by intra-brand competition.
Our conceptual framework, grounded in the literature on organizational learning (e.g.,
Argote 2011; Darr and Kurtzberg 2000), integrates the Motivation-Opportunity-Ability
(MOA) perspective (Argote, McEvily, and Reagans 2003; MacInnis, Moorman, and
Jaworski 1991) with work on proximity-governance linkages (Bradach 1997; Brickley
and Dark 1987; Tracey, Heide, and Bell 2014) to hypothesize the conditions under which
each viewpoint – knowledge transfer or intra-brand competition – might prevail, as
reflected in the focal outlet’s sales performance.

Specifically, we posit that the opportunity to share knowledge afforded by clusteringbased proximity may or may not be realized, depending on (a) the motivation of the focal
outlet to seek knowledge from its proximal outlets, and of the latter to transfer their
knowledge to the focal outlet, (b) the ability of the proximal outlets to transfer relevant
knowledge and the focal outlet to absorb such knowledge, and (c) the governance6
context (i.e., shared ownership and whether franchisor- or franchisee-owned).

The motivation of focal and proximal outlets to seek and transfer knowledge is
hypothesized to vary as a function of shared ownership – i.e., the focal outlet is likely
more motivated to seek knowledge from its proximal outlets, who in turn are likely more
motivated to transfer knowledge to the focal outlet if they are owned by the same multiWe use the term “governance” to reflect the control- and coordination-related benefits conferred by
organizational hierarchy (Williamson 1985, 1996). Henceforth, our use of the term governance refers to the
ownership of the focal outlet.
6
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unit franchisee. We also consider the ability inherent in the age-related experience of the
outlets (reflected in the number of years elapsed since opening) – i.e., the proximal
outlets’ availability of knowledge gained through years of experience, and the focal
outlet’s ability to value, assimilate, and apply this knowledge – i.e., its absorptive
capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Furthermore, the extent to which the focal outlet
might experience variation in the likelihood of intra-brand competition and have the
latitude to act on the knowledge thus transferred and absorbed is expected to vary as a
function of its governance − whether it is franchisor- or franchisee-owned.

We rely on a unique multi-sourced dataset comprising more than 8,000 observations on
the 988 outlets of a large US-based franchise system of automotive services across 41 US
states, from its inception in 1977 to the year 2012. Top management of the franchise
system shared data with respect to each outlet’s location, year of establishment, and
corresponding sales information for a nine-year period from 2004 to 2012. We
supplemented these with relevant information from franchise disclosure documents
(FDD) and with market-specific information we collected from publicly available
archival sources. The rich, fine-grained information provides a unique opportunity to
assess the impact of clustering on individual outlets’ sales performance over time.

We make several key contributions to our understanding of clustering and its
performance consequences. First, rather than limit our consideration to just the beneficial,
knowledge transfer effects of clustering or the potentially negative intra-brand
competition effects, we explicitly acknowledge and assess both possibilities. We argue
that the net impact of clustering on outlet sales depends on the relative strength of each of
these competing effects, and identify the boundary conditions with respect to when one
effect might dominate the other.

Second, we build on evidence suggesting that the knowledge available from different
outlets might vary as a function of their experience (Kalnins and Mayer 2004), and
extend this insight by additionally considering the focal outlet’s ability to absorb this
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available knowledge as a function of its own experience (Cohen and Levinthal 1990;
Zahra and George 2002). As we will discuss subsequently, a low level of either is likely
to significantly compromise knowledge transfer among outlets, resulting in reduced
performance levels. We are thus able to explain how, even within the same cluster of
outlets, performance might vary as a function of the specific focal outlet and the specific
proximal same-brand outlets considered. In emphasizing the role of experience of
proximally located knowledge sources and recipient alike, we extend the notion of
clustering past its exclusive focus on how geographically close the outlets within a cluster
are to the specific identities of the focal outlet and those proximal to it.

Third, we build on and extend recent theoretical discussions (Bell, Tracey, and Heide
2009; Tracey, Heide, and Bell 2014) linking the well-established but hitherto separate
notions of clustering and governance. We propose that variations in the extent of shared
ownership of clustered outlets, and differences between franchisor- and franchisee-owned
outlets in their relative vulnerability to intra-brand competition as well as in the
operational leeway available to them, will likely result in differential performance
outcomes. Ours is the first study, to the best of our knowledge, to unravel the complex
interplay among geographic proximity, individual outlets’ evolving experience, and their
governance.

In the section that follows, we first develop the theoretical underpinnings of our
conceptual framework and discuss the individual hypotheses linking clustering to outletlevel sales performance, and the moderating effects of the governance context. We then
describe the research method, results, and their implications. We conclude with the
limitations of our study and possible future research directions.
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Conceptual Background

Figure 1 displays our proposed conceptual framework. Building on the well-established
literature on organizational learning (Argote 2011; Darr and Kurtzberg 2000; Ho and
Ganesan 2013; Huber 1991), we acknowledge the likely positive effects of clustering
same-brand outlets in terms of the potential it poses for greater learning, interaction, and
knowledge transfer due to their shared brand (Alcacer and Delgado 2016; Lu and Wedig
2013; Tracey, Heide, and Bell 2014). We also recognize the intra-brand competitive
effects of clustering same-brand outlets (Pancras, Sriram, and Kumar 2012). Outlets
clustered with one another are more likely to compete for the same set of customers, and
therefore cannibalize sales (Davis 2006; Kalnins 2004). Our hypotheses address this
fundamental tension and suggest when one perspective might dominate the other. A brief
overview of each perspective follows.

Knowledge Transfer Effect
Argote and Miron-Spektor (2011, p.1124) define organizational learning as “…a change
in the organization’s knowledge that occurs as a function of experience.” Such
knowledge includes both explicit and tacit components, such as technical skills, productand service process-, and local market-specific knowledge (Ho and Ganesan 2013;
Kalnins and Mayer 2004). Acquiring knowledge is an ongoing process and might occur
directly via the focal outlet’s operating experience and/or indirectly from other outlets’
experience (Argote and Miron-Spektor 2011; Bradach 1997; Shane 2005). Learning from
others’ experience may take place through contact learning – transmission of routines
through personal and formal relationships, as well as through mimetic learning –
imitating or vicarious learning of routines from other outlets (e.g., through observation)
(Baum and Ingram 1998; Miner and Haunschild 1995).

To further explain the knowledge transfer effect of clustering, we rely on the wellestablished motivation, opportunity, and ability (MOA) framework (Argote, McEvily,
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and Reagans 2003; MacInnis, Moorman, and Jaworski 1991) to inform our hypotheses.
The opportunity for knowledge transfer exists to the extent that outlets have occasion to
share knowledge with each other. We suggest that greater clustering affords the focal
outlet greater opportunities to seek and acquire knowledge from proximal same-brand
outlets while allowing operators of closely located outlets to observe, meet, and share
knowledge with one another with greater ease (Ganesan, Malter, and Rindfleisch 2005).
Our conceptual framework, however, suggests that such opportunities may or may not be
realized, depending on the motivation and ability of outlets to seek, transfer, and absorb
knowledge, and the governance context – shared ownership and franchisor vs. franchisee
ownership. We briefly outline each factor below.

Motivation to seek and transfer knowledge. Motivation to seek knowledge is the extent to
which a focal outlet is driven to learn from proximal same-brand outlets. Newly
established focal outlets are less experienced and knowledgeable about local market
conditions than more mature focal outlets. Therefore, ceteris paribus, we expect newly
established focal outlets to be more motivated to seek knowledge than their more mature
counterparts. Motivation to transfer knowledge is the extent to which proximal samebrand outlets are willing to share their knowledge with a focal outlet. Within a franchise
system, the franchisor is incentivized and motivated to share operational knowhow with
its franchisees; the transfer of knowledge from franchisor-owned outlets to a franchiseeowned focal outlet is thus likely to be free-flowing (Bradach 1997, 1998). Why might
franchisee-owned outlets, however, be motivated to transfer their knowledge to other
franchisee-owned outlets? Our review of the literature suggests that, although not as
forthcoming with their knowledge as the franchisor, franchisee-owned outlets do share
knowledge with each other even if separately owned and operated (Ingram and Simons
2002) for at least two key reasons. First, proximally located same-brand outlets are likely
to share similar problems and experiences associated with their local markets (Darr and
Kurtzberg 2000). These experiences give same-brand outlets similar frames of reference
that should ease and encourage information sharing (Huber 1991; Shrivastava and
Schneider 1984). Second, proximally located same-brand outlets face similar competition
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(i.e., out-groups) and therefore identify more with their in-group (i.e., same-brand outlets)
(Bhattacharya and Sen 2003; Sherif 1966; Tajfel and Turner 1979). Such identitification
is likely to lead to in-group members having at least moderate levels of motivation to
transfer knowledge to other same-brand outlets.

Ability to transfer and absorb knowledge. Although a necessary condition, the motivation
to transfer knowledge is not sufficient for successful knowledge transfer. What is also
needed is the ability to transfer and absorb knowledge. The ability to transfer knowledge
is the extent to which proximal outlets have relevant skills and information to transfer to
a focal outlet. The more mature an outlet, the more likely it is to have accumulated a
greater amount of experience relative to a newer, less well-established outlet (Brittain
1989; Huber 1991). This greater depth of experience is reflected in stronger
organizational routines and operating procedures, and deeper repositories of knowledge
regarding their appropriate application (Argote and Miron-Spektor 2011; Knott 2003).
Thus, the more mature proximal outlets are, the greater their ability to transfer knowledge
to a focal outlet.7 The ability to absorb knowledge is the extent to which a focal outlet has
the capacity to incorporate information from proximal same-brand outlets. As the focal
outlet gains experience, its ability to value, assimilate, and apply new knowledge – i.e.,
its absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990) – also increases. With an increase in
its absorptive capacity, the focal outlet is more likely to value and use knowledge
available from its proximal same-brand outlets (Cuypers, Cuypers, and Martin 2016), and
to realize higher levels of productivity (Kim 1998) and performance (Chen, Lin, and
Chang 2009).

Intra-Brand Competitive Effect

Coincident with potential knowledge transfer benefits are the costs of intra-brand
competition and the sales cannibalization they elicit. Prior research provides evidence of

7

We also acknowledge the possibility of diminishing returns to experience, and test for this in our
empirical specification.
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increased competition between closely located same-brand outlets (Kalnins 2003, 2004;
Pancras, Sriram, and Kumar 2012). The clustered same-brand outlets sell the same
products and share the same set of customers in close proximity to each other with little
product or service differentiation (Pancras, Sriram, and Kumar 2012), and are therefore
viewed as close substitutes by customers (Kalnins 2003). The perceived substitutability
of same-brand outlets makes travel cost incurred by customers more salient (Davis 2006;
Pancras, Sriram, and Kumar 2012), resulting in the sales cannibalization of existing
outlets (Kalnins 2004). This cannibalization reduces as the distance between outlets
increases (Davis 2006; Kalnins 2004; Pancras, Sriram, and Kumar 2012). Thus,
proximally located same-brand outlets are likely to compete more fiercely than outlets
farther away (Kaufmann and Rangan 1990).

Governance Context as Moderator

Our conceptual framework also identifies two relevant governance characteristics that
help determine whether knowledge transfer or competitive effects dominate. Within the
present context, we consider the shared ownership of the clustered outlets (i.e., multi-unit
operations). We hypothesize shared ownership to result in a likely increased motivation
to seek and transfer knowledge, thereby inducing a significant weakening of intra-brand
competitive effects (Kalnins and Lafontaine 2004). Building on recent theoretical
developments linking governance characteristics and geographic clusters (Bell, Tracey,
and Heide 2009; Tracey, Heide, and Bell 2014), we also identify franchisor vs. franchisee
ownership of clustered outlets as a critical “shifter” (Shane 2001) of the knowledgecompetition boundary effects. Specifically, franchisees are hypothesized to experience
higher costs of intra-brand competition and lower benefits of knowledge transfer relative
to their franchisor-owned counterparts.
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Hypotheses

Clustering Effects

Table 2 reflects the ideas outlined in the previous section and details the underlying logic
for Hypotheses 1A, 1B, and 2 (under “Clustering Effects on Outlet Sales”). We suggest
that clustering provides the opportunity for a focal outlet to learn from same-brand
proximal outlets. Thus, our arguments below rest on the motivation and ability to transfer
and absorb knowledge, and on the intra-brand competition between new and mature, and
focal and proximal, outlets. We first take the perspective of the newly established focal
outlet, followed by that of the mature focal outlet. For both new and mature focal outlets,
we predict the impact of their clustering with other new and mature proximal same-brand
outlets on their sales, balancing knowledge transfer and intra-brand competitive effects.

The perspective of the new focal outlet. Consider the cluster types represented in Table 2,
wherein a new (N) focal outlet i may be clustered at time t with other new (N) or mature
(M) proximal outlets of the same brand, forming clusters CLit(NN) and CLit(NM)
respectively. Given its relative inexperience, a newly established focal outlet is likely to
be highly motivated to seek knowledge from proximal same-brand outlets. However, its
proximal same-brand outlets (whether new or mature) are, at best, moderately motivated
to transfer knowledge due to intra-brand competition with the new focal outlet. In
addition, a newly established focal outlet has less ability (i.e., absorptive capacity) to
absorb knowledge due to its lower accumulated experience (Cohen and Levinthal 1990).
The clustering of a newly established focal outlet with either new proximal same-brand
outlets (with low ability to transfer knowledge) or mature proximal same-brand outlets
(with high ability to transfer knowledge), therefore, does not translate into a significant
knowledge benefit.

Relative to mature outlets, newly established outlets possess less knowledge of their own,
and are less practiced and capable of performing the activities in which they are engaged

73

(Cohen and Levinthal 1990). Newly established outlets do not know local market
conditions and competitors as well as their mature counterparts, thereby negatively
impacting their sales performance. It is this liability of newness that makes a newly
established focal outlet more susceptible to intra-brand competition (Freeman and Carroll
1983). Thus, we would expect a new focal outlet to succumb to the competitive effects of
clustering.

H1A: The greater the clustering of a new focal outlet with other same-brand
outlets, the lower its sales performance.

In addition, we argue that the intra-brand competition experienced by the new focal outlet
is greater when the proximal same-brand outlets are mature – i.e., in CLit(NM) relative to
the CLit(NN) cluster. Mature proximal outlets have greater market knowledge, conferring
on them a competitive advantage over the newly established focal outlets. We therefore
expect that, relative to clustering with other new same-brand outlets (i.e., CLit(NN)), new
focal outlets’ sales performance will be more negative when clustered with mature
proximal outlets (i.e., CLit(NM)).

H1B: New focal outlets clustered with mature same-brand outlets will perform
worse than those clustered with new same-brand outlets.

The perspective of the mature focal outlet. Now consider a scenario where a mature (M)
focal outlet i is clustered at time t with other mature (M) or new (N) proximal outlets of
the same brand, forming clusters CLit(MM) and CLit(MN) respectively. Given its
accumulated experience, a mature focal outlet is likely to have less motivation (than a
new focal outlet) to seek knowledge from proximal others; therefore, it is less relevant
whether its proximal outlets are motivated to transfer knowledge to it. From an ability
standpoint, however, a mature focal outlet is likely to benefit more from being clustered
with mature, rather than new, proximal outlets. A mature focal outlet has greater
accumulated experience and correspondingly higher absorptive capacity than its newly
established counterparts (Zahra and George 2002). As such, it would benefit from being
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clustered with other mature outlets of the same brand which have the ability to transfer
knowledge due to their greater repository of relevant knowledge (Kalnins and Mayer
2004). This knowledge benefit to the mature outlet is limited when clustered with newly
established outlets, as newly established outlets likely possess less relevant knowledge to
transfer (Kalnins and Mayer 2004). From a knowledge transfer perspective, the mature
focal outlet is better served when clustered with other mature outlets rather than with
newly established proximal outlets.

However, from an intra-brand competitive threat perspective, the opposite inference is
likely to prevail – i.e., the mature focal outlet is better served when clustered with newly
established outlets rather than mature outlets. The reason for this inference lies in the
greater market knowledge of the mature focal outlet, which confers a competitive
advantage over the newly established proximal outlets. As proximal outlets’ experience
increases, however, this knowledge-based competitive advantage dissipates, and the focal
outlet experiences a higher level of intra-brand competition from mature proximal outlets.
This trade-off between knowledge benefits and intra-brand competition results in our
hypothesizing no significant difference in sales performance between mature focal outlets
clustered with mature and new outlets.

H2: The greater clustering of a mature focal outlet with other same-brand outlets
will neither help nor hinder its sales performance.

Moderating Effects of Shared Ownership

Our hypotheses thus far have focused on the anticipated main effects of clustering on the
focal outlet’s sales performance. To these, we now add the potential moderating effects
of shared ownership of the focal and proximal outlets (see Moderation Effects of Shared
Ownership, Table 2). We define shared ownership as the extent to which outlets in the
cluster are owned by the same operator as that of the focal outlet. For franchisee-owned
focal outlets, this comprises only those proximal outlets owned by the same focal
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franchisee. When the focal outlet is franchisor-owned, this comprises only the franchisorowned outlets within that cluster.

Shared ownership affects the clustering-performance relationship in at least three ways.
First, shared ownership creates even more opportunities for outlets to transfer knowledge
to one another via multiple means. Indeed, Darr, Argote, and Epple (1995) note that
outlets operating under shared ownership have more regular communication with each
other and a greater number of interpersonal ties than those not sharing common
ownership. Moreover, shared ownership creates more opportunities to transfer knowledge
through contact learning (in addition to mimetic learning), in which knowledge is
transferred through personal and formal relationships (Baum and Ingram 1998; Miner
and Haunschild 1995). Second, shared ownership positively affects the knowledge
transfer process by enhancing the motivation of outlets to seek and share knowledge with
one another (Argote and Darr 2000; Darr and Kurtzberg 2000). Unlike outlets that do not
share a common owner, outlets operating under shared ownership are likely to have
greater norms of reciprocity, a common language system, and incentives to share
knowledge, all of which enhance the motivation to not only seek, but also to share
knowledge (Darr, Argote, and Epple 1995). Third, and perhaps as important, shared
ownership of the clustered outlets weakens the intra-brand competition between the focal
and proximal outlets (Kalnins and Lafontaine 2004). We now discuss how shared
ownership might temper the performance implications of clustering for a newly
established outlet and a mature outlet in turn.

The perspective of the new focal outlet. Recall that, per Hypothesis 1B, we expected a
new focal outlet clustered with mature proximal outlets to underperform relative to a new
focal outlet clustered with newly established outlets. We attributed this to the double
jeopardy of a new focal outlet’s inability to absorb knowledge from proximal (mature and
new) outlets and a higher level of intra-brand competition from more mature proximal
outlets. We expect shared ownership to significantly attenuate (i.e., weaken) both these
adverse effects.
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As the extent of shared ownership between a focal outlet and its proximal outlets
increases, the motivation of the proximal outlets to transfer their knowledge to the focal
outlet increases (Argote, McEvily, and Reagans 2003) due to the common owner’s
objective of ensuring successful operations across her multiple outlets. Although newly
established focal outlets are less able to value, assimilate, and apply new knowledge (i.e.,
lower absorptive capacity), shared ownership creates more opportunities to learn by
contact rather than solely relying on mimetic learning, which can help address some of
these limitations (Darr, Argote, and Epple 1995). Thus, when operating under shared
ownership, newly established focal outlets have additional ways to learn organizational
routines and operating procedures that are less available to outlets that do not share
common ownership.

Just as important, shared ownership of clustered outlets brings about a lowering of intrabrand competition, as clustered outlets that share ownership do not perceive each other as
competitive threats (Kalnins and Lafontaine 2004). Thus, an increase in the extent of
shared ownership likely brings about greater knowledge gains by new focal outlets from
mature proximal outlets. Together, this suggests:

H3: As the extent of shared ownership increases, new focal outlets that are
clustered with mature proximal outlets will perform better than those
clustered with new proximal outlets.

The perspective of the mature focal outlet. Recall that per Hypothesis 2, a mature focal
outlet had more (less) knowledge to gain from other mature (new) proximal outlets, but
also faced more (less) intra-brand competition from these more (less) experienced outlets.
The positive and adverse effects of clustering were expected to counter one another,
resulting in no likely distinguishable performance levels. We expect shared ownership to
change this as well.

As before, shared ownership is likely to enhance the motivation of the focal outlet to seek
knowledge from its co-owned proximal outlets, and for the latter to transfer their
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knowledge to the focal outlet (Hinds and Pfeffer 2003). Mature focal outlets possess
greater accumulated experience and a correspondingly higher level of absorptive capacity
(Zahra and George 2002); as well, mature outlets possess a greater repository of available
relevant knowledge to transfer (Kalnins and Mayer 2004). Thus, mature proximal outlets
are likely to provide knowledge benefits to mature focal outlets that have the ability to
absorb this knowledge. This knowledge transfer-related benefit is likely reduced when
proximal outlets are newly established. Notwithstanding their higher motivation to
transfer knowledge, newly established outlets have less knowledge that might benefit the
mature focal outlet.

Thanks to the dampened intra-brand competition brought about by shared ownership,
mature focal outlets are relatively sheltered from the intra-brand competition typically
associated with the presence of other mature outlets in their vicinity. Thus, an increase in
the extent of shared ownership likely brings about greater knowledge gains by mature
focal outlets from their mature proximal outlets. Together, this suggests:

H4: As the extent of shared ownership increases, mature focal outlets that are
clustered with mature proximal outlets will perform better than those
clustered with new proximal outlets.

Moderating Effects of Franchisor vs. Franchisee Ownership

We draw on the rich body of franchising research on the drivers (Brickley and Dark
1987; Lafontaine and Shaw 2005; Perryman and Combs 2012) and consequences of
outlet ownership (Kalnins 2004; Michael 2000; Srinivasan 2006) to posit moderation of
the earlier hypothesized clustering effects, depending on whether the focal outlet is
franchisor- or franchisee-owned. Relative to franchisor-owned outlets, we suggest that
franchisee-owned outlets are more vulnerable to intra-brand competition and benefit less
from the knowledge transfer opportunity conferred by proximal same-brand outlets. The
resulting increased costs for franchisees and the reduced knowledge benefits to them are
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expected to result in franchisor-owned outlets outperforming their franchisee-owned
counterparts across the clustering scenarios we assess. We discuss the increased costs and
reduced benefits in turn.

As a consequence of higher levels of clustering-induced intra-brand competition,
franchisees are more likely to shirk on quality inputs (Mathewson and Winter 1984) and
to free ride on the efforts of other same-brand outlets (Rubin 1993). Relative to
franchisee-owned outlets, franchisor-owned outlets are less likely to bear the brunt of
intra-brand competition, as the franchisor is likely to be more strategic in ensuring that
revenues at existing franchisor-owned outlets will not go down when new outlets are
added (Kalnins 2004). Franchisor-owned outlets are also more likely to be subject to
greater oversight and supervision by franchise headquarters (Brickley and Dark 1987),
thereby reducing the incidence of shirking (Norton 1988). For these reasons, the costs
and adverse consequences of intra-brand competition are likely lower for franchisorowned outlets, relative to their franchisee-owned counterparts.

As well, we expect franchisees to benefit less from the proximity-conferred learning and
knowledge-sharing opportunity than franchisor-owned outlets. Recall that the benefits of
learning are realized when, on the basis of learning, the focal outlet undertakes different,
improved actions and routines (Dodgson 1993; Huber 1991). Franchise systems, by their
very design, emphasize uniformity over innovation. To ensure the former, franchisors
rely on iron-clad contractual agreements and uniformity-ensuring constraints (Kashyap,
Antia, and Frazier 2012) that reduce the leeway available to franchisees, relative to
franchisor-owned outlets, to make significant changes in response to the additional
knowhow they are able to glean from their proximal same-brand outlets. Thus, even if a
focal franchisee has the opportunity to learn via clustering with proximal same-brand
outlets, has proximal outlets that are motivated and have the ability to transfer knowledge
to it, and additionally has the absorptive capacity to utilize the knowledge transferred, it
may not be able to implement improved actions or routines due to its contractual
constraints.
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In essence, franchisee-owned outlets are (a) more likely to experience the prospect of a
closely located same-brand outlet, and (b) more constrained in their ability to change
their organizational routines and process in response to knowledge received from other
proximal outlets. It is this double jeopardy that leads us to hypothesize that:

H5: Franchisor-owned focal outlets will outperform their franchisee-owned
counterparts, the greater the clustering with other same-brand outlets; the
dominance by franchisor-owned outlets will persist across new and mature
outlets.

Research Method

Empirical Context and Data Collection Procedure

We collaborated with a large US-based franchisor of automotive maintenance and repair
services to test our hypotheses. The firm, which started operations with two outlets in
1977, began franchising in 1988 and currently has 988 franchisor- and franchisee-owned
outlets in 41 US states. The participating firm provided information on the date of
establishment, specific location (street address), and the ownership of each outlet, i.e.,
franchisor- or franchisee-owned, from system inception in 1977 to its 988th outlet in
2012. Additionally, top management shared outlet-level sales performance information
on an annual basis from 2004 to 2012. Examining a firm with multiple outlets in a single
sector enables us to control for sector effects (Perryman and Combs 2012) while
providing us with a unique opportunity to examine issues related to clustering and outlet
governance at a granular level.

Supplementary data collection. We supplemented these data with various firm- and
market-specific variables at the county level such as royalty rate, inter-brand competition,
population, per capita income, and area from Franchise Disclosure Documents (FDDs),
the United States Census Bureau, and the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Table 3 displays
the complete list of variables used in this study and their data sources. The rich
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information in the dataset provides us an unprecedented opportunity to compute spatial
characteristics and link these to individual outlet performance.

Unit of Analysis and Measures
Our unit of analysis is the individual outlet i (i = 1,….,, 988), observed t years since its
inception (t = 0,….., 35). Our objective is to relate the clustering of outlets to their
corresponding sales performance over time. Table 4A provides the descriptive statistics
for all the variables and the pairwise correlations among them; Table 4B displays the
same information for the untransformed raw data.

Sales performance. Our focal dependent variable, outlet-level sales revenue (SRit), is the
natural log-transformed annual sales revenue realized by outlet i in year t.

Cluster types. We assessed the extent to which each outlet i was part of a cluster of samebrand outlets at time t by computing the Local Moran’s I index (Anselin 1995) using
ArcGIS 10.3. The Local Moran’s I estimates clustering strength or spatial autocorrelation
of a focal outlet based on two factors: 1) its geographic proximity to other outlets, and 2)
its similarity to or dissimilarity with other outlets of the same franchise system on a
specific attribute, in our case outlet i’s accumulated experience as inferred from its age.
Given a set of outlet locations and the associated accumulated experience, the Local
Moran’s I computes the extent to which an individual outlet is clustered with other
outlets, and if so, the nature of clustering – with similar or dissimilar accumulated
experience levels.
The computation of the Local Moran’s I generates two outputs 1) the Local Moran’s I
score along with a z-score and a p-value which provide the strength of clustering for each
outlet, and 2) the cluster category of each significantly clustered outlet based on its
attribute (i.e., in the present context, outlet age). The Local Moran’s I identifies outlets
with low (i.e., younger age outlets) and high (older age outlets) attribute values by using
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the normal distribution of outlet age, categorizing each as new and mature respectively.
It, thus, not only allows us to infer the strength of clustering at the individual outlet level,
but also the four archetypal cluster types of theoretical relevance based on age: CLit(NN),
whereby a new focal outlet i is clustered with other new outlets at time t; CLit(NM) ,
indicating a new focal outlet i clustered with mature outlets at time t; CLit(MM), when a
mature focal outlet i is clustered with other mature outlets at time t; and CLit(MN), when a
mature focal outlet i is clustered with new outlets at time t. Prior studies in marketing
have used Moran’s I index to measure spatial dependence of variables (e.g., Mittal,
Kamakura, and Govind 2004; Peters, Albers, and Kumar 2008). The Appendix 3A
provides additional details with respect to the Local Moran’s I computation, and Figure 2
displays examples from our data of each of the four prototypical clustering types.

Shared ownership. Consistent with prior research (Lu and Wedig 2013), we define
clustering within a boundary of 25-mile radius of the focal outlet, and measure shared
ownership of clustered outlets (SOit) as the count of proximal outlets j within this 25-mile
radius of the focal outlet i at time t. For franchisee-owned focal outlets, this measure
counts only those proximal outlets that are owned by the same focal franchisee (i.e.,
multi-unit franchisees). When the focal outlet is franchisor-owned, the count includes
only franchisor-owned outlets within 25-radius of the focal outlet.

Franchisor vs. franchisee ownership. We operationalize franchisor vs. franchisee
ownership (FFOi) as a dichotomous variable which takes a value of 1 when an outlet i is
franchisee-owned, and 0 when franchisor-owned (Dutta, Bergen, Heide, and John 1995;
Heide 2003).

Control variables. We incorporate several control variables that are expected to have an
impact on the individual outlet’s sales performance over and above our hypothesized
variables. We measure the cluster size (CSit) as the number of same-brand outlets within a
25-mile radius of a focal outlet. We also include the mean age of outlets in a 25-mile
radius of the focal outlet, incorporating its quadratic term as well to control for the
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possibility of diminishing returns to experience. We control for franchise system size
(FSt) ̶ the total number of outlets in operation in year t, and royalty rate (RRt) ̶ the
ongoing payment as a percentage of sales that franchisees must pay the franchisor for
their use of the trademark and other support. System size reflects overall access of the
outlet to resources which could impact performance; royalties incentivize franchisor
investments in the brand (Agrawal and Lal 1995), thereby boosting franchisee sales and
making the franchise more attractive to franchisees (Shane 1998). We also control for
market-specific effects on outlet sales performance. The most fine-grained market data
we are able to collect is at the US county level k (k=1,…., 270). We include inter-brand
competition (IBCkt) – the total number of outlets of other competing brands, included in
the five-digit NAICS code corresponding to the sector in which the franchise system
operates, located in county k in year t. We also include the population (POPkt) of county
k in year t, the income per capita (INkt) in county k in year t, and the area of the county
(ARk) in square miles. Finally, we control for unobserved heterogeneity by including
year-specific fixed effects for the t years in our dataset.

Model Specification

Although we were able to obtain data pertaining to individual outlet locations from the
inception of the franchise system in 1977, corresponding outlet sales data are available
only from 2004, and are missing for some outlets. To account for potential biased
parameter estimates due to sales data not missing at random, we correct for selection bias
(Cameron and Trivedi 2005; Greene 2003) by specifying a Heckman selection model
(Heckman 1976) in the first stage of the analysis and including the lambda vector thus
obtained in the second stage. This second-stage (substantive) equation investigates the
interplay of clustering, shared ownership, franchisor- versus franchisee-ownership of the
focal outlet, and their impact on outlet sales performance while accounting for potential
endogeneity of the regressors.
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Stage 1: Correction for sample selection bias. We specify our selection equation as a
probit model as follows:

(1)

𝐼𝑁𝐶𝐿𝑈𝐷𝐸𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝐹𝐸𝑖 + ∑10
𝑞=3 𝛽𝑞 𝑌𝑅𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

Where,
INCLUDEit = Outlet i’s availability of sales information at time t,
OAit
= Age of Outlet i at time t,
FEi
= Franchisee-Owned as a binary variable (franchisee-owned = 1, and 0
otherwise),
YRt
= Specific Years as dummy variables with 2004 as the excluded base year,
and εit ~ N(μ1, σ2)
From equation (1) above, we obtain and store the Inverse Mills Ratio (i.e., Lambda)
vector for subsequent inclusion in the second stage of analysis.
Stage 2: Substantive equation estimation. In the second stage, we relate each outlet’s
clustering, shared ownership, and franchisor vs. franchisee ownership to its annual sales
performance. Our model specification approach in this stage is informed by the need to
account for the potential endogeneity of regressors – clustering (CLit(NN), CLit(NM),
CLit(MM), CLit(MN)), shared ownership (SOit), and franchisor vs. franchisee ownership
(FFOi). The clustering-related regressors and shared ownership are time-varying,
whereas franchisor vs. franchisee ownership is time-invariant. Durbin-Wu-Hausman tests
of these variables yielded significant evidence of endogeneity. We therefore specified an
endogeneity-correcting regression equation. We treat the interactions of clustering with
shared ownership and with franchisor vs. franchisee ownership as endogenous, since
interaction terms of endogenous regressors are also endogenous (Wooldridge 2010).

We use the Hausman-Taylor Instrumental Variables (henceforth, HTIV) regression
approach to account for endogenous regressors. Several prior research studies in
marketing have used the HTIV model to account for the endogeneity of time-varying and
time-invariant regressors (e.g., Boulding and Christen 2003, 2008; Germann, Ebbes, and
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Grewal 2015; Jacobson 1990. See Appendix 3B for estimation details and checks of its
appropriateness). We specify our HTIV model as follows (variables in bold font denote
endogenous regressors, of which governance (GOVi) is time invariant):
(2)

SRit = η0 + η1 CLit(NN) + η2 CLit(NM) + η3 CLit(MM) + η4 CLit(MN) + η5 SOit + η6 FFOi
+ η7 CLit(NN)* SOit + η8 CLit(NM) * SOit + η9 CLit(MM) * SOit + η10 CLit(MN) * SOit
+ η11 CLit(NM)* FFOi + η12 CLit(MM) * FFOi + η13 CLit(MN) * FFOi + η14 CSit
+ η15 APit + η16 (APit)2 + η17 FSt + η18 RRt +η19 IBCkt + η20 POPkt + η21 INkt
+ η22 ARk + η23 IMRit + ∑31
𝑟=24 𝜂r YRt + αi + uit

Where,
SRit = Outlet Sales Revenue (natural log-transformed),
CLit(NN) = Clustering of a new focal outlet with other new outlets,
CLit(NM) = Clustering of a new focal outlet with mature outlets,
CLit(MM) = Clustering of a mature focal outlet with other mature outlets,
CLit(MN) = Clustering of a mature focal outlet with new outlets,
SOit = Shared ownership of clustered outlets,
FFOi = Ownership of a focal outlet i (franchisee-owned = 1, franchisor-owned = 0),
CSit = Cluster Size,
APit
= Mean Age of Clustered Outlets,
(APit)2 = Quadratic Term for Mean Age of Clustered Outlets,
FSt
= Firm Size,
RRt
= Royalty Rate,
IBCkt = Inter-brand Competition,
POPkt = Market Population (natural log-transformed),
INkt
= Income per capita (natural log-transformed),
ARk
= Market Area (natural log-transformed),
YRt
= Year,
IMRit = Inverse Mills Ratio,
αi ~ iid (µ2, σα2), and uit ~ iid (µ3, σe2).
Note that over the period 2004 through 2012, there are no observed instances of
clustering of new franchisor-owned outlets with other new outlets. As such, the impact of
franchisee-owned new outlets clustering with other new outlets may be inferred by
reference to the main effect of CLit(NN) in Eq (2) above.
Results

Model-free evidence. Per Table 4A, the clustering of a new focal outlet with other outlets
is significantly and negatively correlated with outlet sales (r(CLit(NN)) = -.05; r(CLit(NM)) =
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-.04, both p < .01), as we expected. In comparison, the clustering of mature outlets is
significantly and positively correlated with outlets when proximal outlets are mature
((r(CLit(MM)) = .10, p < .01), and negatively correlated when proximal outlets are new
((r(CLit(MN)) = -.04, p < .01). Clearly, the clustering of new focal outlets is associated with
less favorable sales performance than the clustering of mature focal outlets. Thus, these
results provide initial model-free evidence for our baseline hypotheses H1 and H2.
The Heckman selection model. The overall model is significant (Wald χ2 = 10.58, p <
.01), and we find clear evidence of selection with respect to sales information availability
(λ = -1.15, p < .01). We find that mature outlets (β1 = .05, p < .01) are more likely to
provide sales information, whereas franchisee-owned outlets (β2 = -.24, p < .01) are less
likely to provide sales information relative to franchisor-owned outlets. We also find that
relative to the base year of 2004, there is greater availability of outlet sales information in
subsequent years.

The HTIV estimation. Table 5 displays the results of the HTIV estimation. The overall
model is significant (Wald χ2 = 11,096.91, p < .01), suggesting that the hypothesized
predictors of outlet-level sales performance have significant explanatory power. The
main effect of clustering on the focal outlets’ sales performance is significant and
negative when new focal outlets are clustered with new proximal outlets (η1 = -.03, p <
.01), and with mature proximal outlets (η2 = -.10; p < .05) of the same brand. We
therefore find support for hypothesis H1A. However, there were no significant sales
performance differences between new focal outlets being clustered with new or mature
proximal outlets of the same brand (χ2 = 2.49, n.s.); hypothesis H1B is therefore not
supported. As hypothesized, we find no impact of clustering of mature focal outlets with
other mature (η3 = .01; n.s.) or new outlets (η4 = .04; n.s.) on the focal outlets’ sales
performance. We thus find support for hypothesis H2.

We also find support for Hypothesis H3, which predicted that new focal outlets perform
better when clustered with mature (η8 = .01, p < .05) rather than new (η7 = -.01, p < .01)
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proximal outlets that are under shared ownership. Per H4, as the extent of shared
ownership increases, mature focal outlets gain sales when clustered with mature proximal
outlets (η9 = .00, p < .01), and lose sales when clustered with new proximal outlets (η10 =
-.02, p < .01). Thus, hypothesis H4 is supported.

Hypothesis H5 predicted that franchisee-owned outlets would gain less from clustering
relative to franchisor-owned outlets. We find partial support for this hypothesis.
Specifically, we find that mature franchisee-owned outlets achieve lower sales than their
franchisor-owned counterparts, when in close proximity to other mature outlets (η12 = .07, p < .01), which is in line with hypothesis H5. Relative to their franchisor-owned
counterparts, the clustering of new franchisee-owned outlets with mature outlets results in
significant gains to sales performance (η11 = .09, p < .05). This runs counter to hypothesis
H5. Furthermore, we find that the clustering of mature franchisees outlets with new
outlets does not significantly differ relative to their franchisor-owned counterparts (η13 =
-.14, n.s.). Finally, the franchise system had no instances of new franchisor-owned outlets
clustering with other new outlets: the lack of a contrast precludes the ability to test their
relationship. Overall, franchisor vs. franchisee ownership is found to significantly affect
the clustering-performance relationship for both new and mature focal outlets.
With respect to control variables, we find that firm size (η17 = .00, p < .01) significantly
and positively affects outlet-level sales. Cluster size (η14 = -.10, p < .01) and royalty rate
(η18 = -.39, p < .01), however, have a significant and negative relationship with outletlevel sales. The mean age of cluster (η15 = -.06, p < .01) is significantly and negatively
associated with outlet sales but with a marginally significant diminishing trend (η16 = .00,
p < .10). For market-specific control variables, greater population (η20 = .20, p < .01) and
per capita income (η21 = 1.04, p < .01) significantly and positively increase outlet-level
sales, whereas inter-brand competition (η19 = .00, p < .10) partially and positively affects
outlet-level sales. Market area (η22 = -.05, n.s.) does not significantly affect outlet-level
sales. Finally, we find significant year-specific effects on outlet-level sales.
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Post hoc Analysis of Significant Interactions

For a better understanding of the moderating impact of shared ownership and franchisor
vs. franchisee ownership on clustering and outlet-level sales relationship, we conducted
an analysis of simple slopes for all significant interactions (Aiken and West 1991;
Dawson 2014; DeCoster and Leistico 2007). Table 6 displays the results corresponding to
the significant two-way interactions.
An examination of Figure 3A (Panel 1 & 2) suggests that new focal outlets’ sales are not
significantly affected by their clustering with mature proximal outlets under the shared
ownership (the simple slope of CLit(NM) for franchisor-owned focal outlets = .08, n.s.).
New focal outlets, however, lose more sales when clustered with other new outlets under
the shared ownership (the simple slope of CLit(NN) for franchisor-owned focal outlets = .20, p < .01). Figure 3A (Panel 3 & 4) suggests that mature focal outlets gain sales when
clustered with other mature outlets in the presence of shared ownership (the simple slope
of CLit(MM) for franchisor-owned focal outlets = .12, p < .01). Mature focal outlets’ sales
performance, however, is harmed when clustered with new outlets under the shared
ownership (the simple slope of CLit(NN) for franchisor-owned focal outlets = -.67, p <
.01).

Figure 3B (Panel 1) suggests that clustering of a new focal outlet with mature outlets
harms outlet-level sales when the focal outlet is franchisor-owned (the simple slope of
CLit(NM) for franchisor-owned focal outlets = -.10, p < .05). Relative to franchisor-owned
new focal outlets, franchisee-owned new focal outlets are not significantly hurt or helped
by their proximity to mature outlets (the simple slope of CLit(NM) for franchisee-owned
focal outlets = -.01, n.s.). Figure 3B (Panel 2) suggests that mature franchisor-owned
focal outlets’ clustering with other mature outlets has no significant impact on their sales
performance (the simple slope of CLit(MM) for franchisee-owned focal outlets = .01, n.s.).
It is only franchisee-owned mature focal outlets that lose from greater clustering with
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other mature outlets (the simple slope of CLit(MM) for franchisee-owned focal outlets = .06, p < .05).

Alternate Specifications

We assessed the stability of our findings to alternate estimation approaches, alternate
measures of performance, alternative explanations for the effects reported, alternate timerelated specifications, and alternative levels of analysis.

Alternate estimator. In order to test the robustness of our results, we used the fixedeffects approach as an alternate estimator. The FE estimation results in the dropping of
the time-invariant franchisor vs. franchisee ownership (FFOi) variable, but retains all four
archetypal clustering types and their interactions with shared ownership and franchisor
vs. franchisee ownership. All results with respect to the hypothesized effects remain
robust.

Alternate measure of performance. We also relied on a different but related measure of
outlet performance – sales transaction volume, which we operationalized as the total
number of transactions reported by each outlet per year. Our HTIV estimates remain
robust to this alternate measure of performance as well.

Alternative explanation for the effects reported. We also explored the possibility that the
focal outlet’s sales might be impacted not because of any knowledge transfer pursuant to
clustering, but rather by better franchisor monitoring capabilities as a function of nearby
franchisor-owned outlets. So as to test this alternative explanation, we computed the
number of franchisor-owned outlets in the county of location of the focal outlet, and
included this variable in our model. All the clustering-related effects and their
interactions with shared ownership and franchisor vs. franchisee ownership remain
robust, and the main effect of the additional regressor is non-significant.
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Alternate temporal separation. Our conceptualization and subsequent model specification
approach have proceeded on the assumption of contemporaneous (immediate, within the
same year) effects of clustering on the sales performance of each outlet. We also assessed
one- and two-year lagged models of the hypothesized relationships. Our principal
findings of baseline hypotheses, and that of moderating effects of shared ownership and
franchisor vs. franchisee ownership, persist.

Alternate level of analysis. Prior research has mostly used clustering as a global or
system-wide construct (within the present context, across all 988 outlets of the franchise
system) without investigating the type of clustering or with whom a focal outlet is
clustered. We therefore specified an alternate model, measuring clustering at the systemlevel and treating it as an endogenous regressor. The HTIV estimation results show that
the system-wide clustering of outlets is positively and significantly associated with the
individual outlets’ sales. This is consistent with prior research which does not pay heed to
the accumulated experience, shared ownership, and franchisor vs. franchisee ownership
of the clustered outlets (see, for example, Lu and Wedig 2013). This result, however,
masks the nuances that emerge from a fuller consideration of the specific identities of the
focal and proximal outlets, and provides a misleading confidence in clustering effects on
performance.

Discussion
Proximity is a contentious issue for all franchising participants. Yet, it is a particular
irritant for franchisees due to sales cannibalization concerns. Although much has been
made of the positive effects of clustering, our own assessment of its impact suggests that
concerns regarding the proximity of other same-brand outlets are well placed. Our
contention that physical distance is not the sole determinant of outlet sales finds support.
We discuss the theoretical and managerial implications of our findings in turn.
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Theoretical Implications

The present research is motivated by the conflicting findings and assertions about the
effects of clustering. It is important to note that disagreements with respect to clusteringattributable performance exist not only across but also within paradigms. Consider, for
example, how much at odds the studies reporting positive effects of agglomeration
(Chung and Kalnins 2001) are with those warning of significant sales cannibalization
(Pancras, Sriram, and Kumar 2012). A similar schism is observed even for those adopting
a sociology-informed clustering viewpoint and the knowledge transfer this implies.
Whereas Lu and Wedig (2013) report positive performance effects, Ingram and Baum
(1997) find evidence of a negative impact of clustering.
Our study builds on and significantly extends both streams of work. We further unpack
the knowledge transfer paradigm, even while acknowledging the possibility of proximityinduced intra-brand competition. In particular, we call for a more nuanced consideration
of clustering’s impact – one that emphasizes not just physical distance, but physical
distance from whom. In contrast to prior assessments of clustering’s performance-related
consequences, we posit and find strong evidence in support of the notion that the
association between proximity and performance is not direct nor strictly positive. Rather,
outlet performance may be helped or hindered by clustering with other same-brand
outlets, depending on the motivation of the proximal outlets to transfer their knowledge
to the focal outlet and the latter’s ability to absorb such knowledge. We provide evidence
consistent with the notion that whereas motivation to transfer knowledge to the focal
outlet increases with shared ownership, the ability to absorb this knowledge varies with
the age and consequent operating experience of the focal outlet.
This insight leads naturally to the next theoretical implication − that the specific identities
of the focal outlet and of the same-brand outlets it may cluster with matter. Once it is
acknowledged (a) that the impact of clustering might vary by outlets comprising the
cluster, and (b) that in addition to physical distance, experience gained (whether own or
through the experience of others) matters, it becomes possible to discern and explain
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variations in performance for different outlets within the cluster. It is worth noting that
until now, research on clustering has focused exclusively on system-level clustering; in
the present context, this amounts to a single “clustering score” representing the extent of
clustering across all 988 outlets of the franchise system we assessed. As we have
demonstrated previously, such an aggregative approach does indeed yield a positive
association between clustering and sales. It is only when clustering is unpacked, that is,
an individual outlet’s extent of clustering with other same-brand outlets is considered,
that we see evidence of positive and negative cluster-attributable effects. Our research
calls for a more subtle, disaggregated approach to assessing clustering’s impact.

A third important theoretical implication pertains to the critical role of at least two facets
of the governance context, and their interplay with proximity. We find shared ownership
to be a critical “shifter” (Shane 2001) of the motivation for knowledge transfer among
proximal same-brand outlets. When the focal outlet and its proximal same-brand outlets
share ownership (whether they be franchisees operating under the same multi-unit
franchisee, or franchisor-owned outlets clustered proximally), intra-brand competition is
reduced. Importantly, we also find the juxtaposition of both governance and proximity,
alluded to and emphasized by Heide and his colleagues, to have significant performance
implications. Marrying insights from the well-known agency problem that franchising is
subject to (Galini and Lutz 1992; Lafontaine 1992; Lal 1990) with the literature on
knowledge transfer (Argote 2011), we hypothesize and find evidence consistent with the
notion that franchisor vs. franchisee ownership serves to temper the effects of clustering.
Franchisees are seen to realize reduced gains and increased costs relative to their
franchisor partners. This finding is central to explaining and reconciling the significantly
diverging contentions of each party with respect to proximity referred to in the opening
quotations of this research effort.

All in all, the present study emphasizes that the impact of clustering for each franchise
system participant is not at all straightforward. Rather, it varies, depending on the
motivation of the proximal outlets to transfer their knowledge to the focal outlet and the
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ability of the focal outlet to absorb this knowledge and act on it. The governance context,
as reflected in shared ownership of the clustered outlets, does appear to significantly
temper (strengthen) the motivation of proximal outlets to transfer their knowledge; as
well, franchisee ownership is found to be associated with mixed results – whereas mature
franchisee-owned outlets experience reduced sales in proximity to other mature outlets,
their newly established counterparts do not. Together, our findings suggest a far more
nuanced interplay of proximity, its knowledge transfer possibilities, and the potential for
intra-brand competition.

Managerial Implications

For franchisees. Our post hoc calculations suggest that, relative to franchisor-owned
outlets, a new franchisee-owned outlet may expect to gain 9.5 per cent of mean annual
sales or just over $39,000 when clustered with mature same-brand outlets8. Although the
preceding result runs counter to our expectation, one explanation for this might lie in new
franchisees’ increased motivation to gain as much as possible from the experience gained
and knowledge shared by clustered mature outlets. Relative to franchisor-owned outlets,
mature franchisee-owned outlets lose mean annual sales of 6.7 per cent (just over
$27,000) when clustered with other mature outlets of the same brand. All in all, our
results imply that franchisees opening new outlets closer to mature outlets of the same
brand are likely to realize significant sales performance gains. In contrast, ceteris
paribus, mature franchisees clustered with other mature same-brand outlets find
themselves facing the prospect of intra-brand competition.

For franchisors. Similar to franchisees, franchisor-owned outlets also experience a mixed
bag for their clustering with other same-brand outlets. A new franchisor-owned focal
outlet loses nearly 10 per cent or just over $39,000 in mean annual sales when clustered
with mature outlets. When new franchisor-owned outlets are clustered with other new

8

These estimates and those that follow are based on the current sample; no claim is made regarding their
generalizability.
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outlets, the loss in sales is not nearly as bad – these outlets lose on average just over 3 per
cent of their mean annual sales or close to $12,500. We also find that mature franchisorowned outlets remain relatively unaffected by outlet clustering, regardless whether the
cluster comprises new or mature proximal outlets. Taken together, the pattern of results
suggests that franchisors mindful of the sales performance of the outlets owned by them
would be well advised to avoid establishing these outlets in proximity to other samebrand outlets, whether mature or new.

Across both franchisor- and franchisee-owned outlets, shared ownership of the focal and
proximal outlets does appear to help facilitate knowledge transfer and blunt intra-brand
competition. Under shared ownership, newly established outlets clustered with mature
proximal outlets outperform their counterparts clustered with new proximal outlets by
nearly 1 per cent of mean annual sales or just under $5,000. For mature outlets, the
difference is even more striking – mature outlets clustered with other mature proximal
outlets outperform their counterparts clustered with new proximal outlets by nearly 3 per
cent of mean annual sales or just under $11,500. Given the average multi-unit owning
entity (whether franchisor or multi-unit franchisee) in this franchise system owns 21
outlets, the sales performance gains accruing from shared ownership are certainly
significant.

Limitations and Future Research Directions

As with any research effort, our own study has limitations that we hope will form the
basis for future research. First, although we were able to track the sales performance of
each outlet in the franchise system over an extended period of time, we were able to do
only from 2004. Future research that includes information on the evolution of sales
performance over the entire life-cycle of the franchise system and/or its individual outlets
would provide much needed additional insights with respect to proximity and its
performance consequences for early- versus late-in-the-lifecycle franchise systems.
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Second, our reliance on archival data over nearly a decade, while a significant strength of
our research effort because of the longitudinal insights it affords, also limits our ability to
directly observe (or solicit survey responses regarding) the preceding variables directly.
Instead, we rely on proxy variables on the assumption that the relationship between the
proxy and the concept to be measured is reasonable (Lafontaine 1992). Additional efforts
to integrate archival with micro (survey-based, for example) data would add significant
value, in our opinion.

Finally, we analyze and report results on the evolution of a single franchise system only.
My results are therefore specific to this sample. Future efforts that include multiple firms
from diverse industries would help extend our findings by considering multiple franchise
system outlets and their competitive and cooperative interactions over time.
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TABLE 1
SELECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH ON THE IMPACT OF PROXIMITY
GovernanceInduced
Effects
Considered

Outlet-Level
Clustering
Considered

Location’s
Financial
Performance
Considered

Study

Context

Knowledge Transfer
vs. Intra-brand
Competition
Considered

Ingram and Baum
(1997)

Hotels in Manhattan

Knowledge transfer

No

No

No

Knowledge transfer

Yes

No

No

Other (Monitoring cost)

No

Yes

No

Kalnins and
Mayer (2004)
Lu and Wedig
2013
Brickley and
Dark (1987)

Kalnins (2004)

Ganesan, Malter,
and Rindfleisch
(2005)
Pancras, Sriram,
and Kumar
(2012)

Perryman and
Combs (2012)

This Study

Pizza restaurants in
Texas
For-profit nursing
home chains in the
US
Franchise
companies in
multiple industries
in the US
Franchised and
company-owned
lodging
establishments in
Texas
Firms in the U.S.
optics industry
A franchised chain
of fast food
restaurants in a
large US
metropolitan area
Fast-food/quickservice
establishments in
Florida
A large US based
automotive service
franchise system

Other (Monitoring cost)

Yes

No

No

Key Findings
Chain-affiliated hotels are less likely to
survive when the chain operated more
units there.
Multiunit owners benefit from local
congenital experience.
Clustered nursing homes achieve higher
quality due to close monitoring.
Company-owned units are located closer to
monitoring headquarters.

New same-brand franchised outlets
cannibalize the incumbents' revenues.
Intra-brand competition

Yes

No

Yes

Knowledge transfer

No

No

No

Intra-brand competition

No

No

Yes

Firms located in close proximity engage in
increased face-to-face communication, but
this has little effect on acquiring new
product enhancing knowledge.
Sales cannibalization increases as the
distance between stores decreases.

Multi-outlet franchising is cost efficient.
Other
(Monitoring cost)

Both

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

The impact of clustering of same-brand
outlets on their sales is contingent on
outlets’ experience and the governance
context.
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TABLE 2
THE LOGIC OF HYPOTHESES

Cluster
Type

Outlet
Type

Motivation
to seek
knowledge
Motivation
to transfer
knowledge

Ability to
absorb
knowledge
Ability to
transfer
knowledge

Knowledge
Benefit to the
Focal Outlet

Intra-Brand
Competition
Faced by the
Focal Outlet

Low

High

Low

Higher

High

High

Specific
Hypothesis

Clustering Effects on Outlet Sales

CLit(NN)
CLit(NM)
CLit(MM)
CLit(MN)

Focal
Proximals
Focal
Proximals
Focal
Proximals
Focal
Proximals

High
Moderate
High
Moderate
Low
Moderate
Low
Moderate

Low
Low
Low
High
High
High
High
Low

H1A, H1B

H2
Low

Low

Low

Low

Moderate

Low

High

Low

Low

Low

Moderation Effects of Shared Ownership

CLit(NN)
CLit(NM)
CLit(MM)
CLit(MN)

Focal
Proximals
Focal
Proximals
Focal
Proximals
Focal
Proximals

High
High
High
High
High
High
High
High

Low
Low
Low
High
High
High
High
Low

H3

H4

Note: Subscripts “N” and “M” denote new and mature outlets. The first letter always
represents the focal outlet, whereas the second one always represents proximal outlets.
For example, CLNM cluster type indicates a new focal outlet that is clustered with mature
proximal outlets of the same brand.
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TABLE 3
VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES
Construct

Clustering

Shared Ownership
Franchisor vs.
Franchisee Ownership
Sales Performance

Measured Variable
Proximity of a new focal outlet i with other
same-brand new outlets j in year t
Proximity of a new focal outlet i with samebrand mature outlets j in year t
Proximity of a mature focal outlet i with
other same-brand mature outlets j in year t
Proximity of a mature focal outlet i with
same-brand new outlets j in year t
Shared ownership of a focal outlet i with
other same-brand outlets j within a cluster
in year t
Dichotomous variable which equals 1 when
a focal outlet i is franchisee-owned and 0 if
franchisor-owned
Sales revenue of a focal outlet i in year t

Notation

Data Source

CLit(NN)
CLit(NM)
CLit(MM)

Computed using ArcGIS 10.3

CLit(MN)
SOit

FFOi

Internal Company Records

SRit

Control Variables
Cluster Size
Mean Age of
Clustered Outlets
Firm Size
Royalty Rate
Inter-brand
Competition
Area (square miles)
Population (millions)
Income (millions)

Number of outlets within 25-mile radius of
a focal outlet i in year t
Mean age of proximal outlets within 25mile radius of a focal outlet i in year t
Total number of outlets in year t
The ongoing payment as a percentage of
sales in year t
Number of outlets of competitor brands
located in county k in year t
Area of county k
Population of county k in year t
Income per capita of county k in year t

CSit
APit

Computed using ArcGIS 10.3
Internal Company Records

FSt
RRt
IBCkt
ARk
POPkt
INkt

Franchise Disclosure Documents
US Census Bureau
Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA)
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TABLE 4A
CORRELATION MATRIX AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

SRit

-

Clustering (new-new)

CLit(NN)

-0.05

-

3

Clustering (new-mature)

CLit(NM)

-0.04

-0.07

-

4

Clustering (mature-mature)

CLit(MM)

0.10

-0.16

-0.07

-

5

Clustering (mature-new)

CLit(MN)

-0.04

-0.02

-0.01

-0.02

-

Shared Ownership

SOit

0.07

0.02

-0.06

0.35

-0.02

-

7

Franchisor vs Franchisee Ownership

FFOi

-0.11

0.27

-0.07

-0.54

0.03

-0.35

-

8

Cluster Size

CSit

0.02

-0.02

0.05

0.31

0.00

0.89

-0.31

-

9

Mean Age of Clustered Outlets

APit

0.24

-0.51

0.15

0.52

-0.03

0.30

-0.63

0.31

-

Firm Size

FSt

0.32

0.06

0.00

0.04

0.04

0.01

0.07

0.02

0.22

-

11

Royalty Rate

RRt

0.13

0.05

0.00

0.03

0.04

-0.01

0.07

0.00

0.22

0.72

-

12

Inter-Brand Competition

IBCkt

-0.08

0.21

-0.02

-0.07

0.10

0.15

0.15

0.17

-0.07

0.06

0.07

-

POPkt

0.04

0.13

-0.04

0.03

0.05

0.41

0.07

0.42

0.05

0.03

0.05

0.68

-

INkt

0.17

0.20

-0.02

0.03

0.05

0.34

0.08

0.38

0.01

0.29

0.23

0.17

0.42

-

ARk

-0.07

0.10

-0.05

-0.10

0.02

-0.15

0.24

-0.15

-0.04

0.05

0.06

0.45

0.32

-0.08

-

Mean

12.92

0.75

0.12

1.21

0.01

8.07

0.59

9.26

9.16

817.9

8.42

65.71

1.08

10.03

3.14

SD

0.87

1.89

0.67

2.89

0.21

6.84

0.49

7.82

5.58

87.45

0.49

112.6

9.75

11.49

9.91

1
2

6

10

13
14
15

Outlet Sales

Market

Populationa

Income per
Market

Revenuea

capitaa

Areaa

n1= 12,909
Correlations exceeding |.02| are significant at p < .05, two-tailed
a: Natural log-transformed
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TABLE 4B
CORRELATION MATRIX AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (RAW VALUES)
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

1

Outlet Sales Revenue

SRit

-

2

Clustering (new-new)

CLit(NN)

0.03

-

3

Clustering (new-mature)

CLit(NM)

-0.03

-0.07

-

4

Clustering (mature-mature)

CLit(MM)

0.07

-0.16

-0.07

-

5

Clustering (mature-new)

CLit(MN)

-0.03

-0.02

-0.01

-0.02

-

6

Shared Ownership

SOit

0.08

0.02

-0.06

0.35

-0.02

-

7

Franchisor vs Franchisee Ownership

FFOi

-0.08

0.27

-0.07

-0.54

0.03

-0.35

-

8

Cluster Size

CSit

0.04

-0.02

0.05

0.31

0.00

0.89

-0.31

-

9

Mean Age of Clustered Outlets

APit

0.19

-0.51

0.15

0.52

-0.03

0.30

-0.63

0.31

-

10

Firm Size

FSt

0.33

0.06

0.00

0.04

0.04

0.01

0.07

0.02

0.22

-

11

Royalty Rate

RRt

0.15

0.05

0.00

0.03

0.04

-0.01

0.07

0.00

0.22

0.72

-

12

Inter-Brand Competition

IBCkt

-0.08

0.21

-0.02

-0.07

0.10

0.15

0.15

0.17

-0.07

0.06

0.07

-

13

Market Population

POPkt

-0.06

0.21

-0.02

-0.05

0.11

0.19

0.13

0.20

-0.03

0.07

0.09

0.99

-

14

Income per capita

INkt

0.25

0.23

-0.02

0.01

0.05

0.31

0.09

0.34

-0.02

0.27

0.21

0.15

0.18

-

15

Market Area

ARk

-0.09

0.16

-0.03

-0.09

0.04

-0.07

0.19

-0.08

-0.07

0.07

0.09

0.39

0.38

-0.10

-

Mean

522614

0.75

0.12

1.21

0.01

8.07

0.59

9.26

9.16

817.86

8.42

65.71

756475

42350

1420.3

SD

306703

1.89

0.67

2.89

0.21

6.84

0.49

7.82

5.58

87.45

0.49

112.57

1210491

10249

23.20

n1= 12,909
Correlations exceeding |.02| are significant at p < .05, two-tailed
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TABLE 5
HAUSMAN-TAYLOR INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE (HTIV)
REGRESSION ESTIMATES
Outlet Sales Revenuea

Intercept
Clustering (new-new)
Clustering (new-mature)
Clustering (mature-mature)
Clustering (mature-new)
Shared Ownership
Franchisee Ownership
Clustering (new-new) * Shared Ownership
Clustering (new-mature) * Shared Ownership
Clustering (mature-mature) * Shared Ownership
Clustering (mature-new) * Shared Ownership
Clustering (new-mature) * Franchisee Ownership
Clustering (mature-mature) * Franchisee Ownership
Clustering (mature-new) * Franchisee Ownership
Cluster Size
Mean Age of Clustered Outlets
Change in Mean Age of Clustered Outlets
Firm Size
Royalty Rate
Inter-brand Competition
Market Populationa
Income per capitaa
Market Areaa
Inverse Mills Ratio
Year Fixed Effects

Hs

CLit(NN)
CLit(NM)
CLit(MM)
CLit(MN)
SOit
FFOi
CLit(NN) * SOit
CLit(NM) * SOit
CLit(MM) * SOit
CLit(MN) * SOit
CLit(NM) * FFOi
CLit(MM) * FFOi
CLit(MN) * FFOi
CSit
APit
(APit)2
FSt
RRt
IBCkt
POPkt
INkt
ARk
IMRit
YRt

η0
η1
η2
η3
η4
η5
η6
η7
η8
η9
η10
η11
η12
η13
η14
η15
η16
η17
η18
η19
η20
η21
η22
η23
η24-31

H1A,1B
H1A,1B
H2
H2

Number of Observations = n2 = 6,576; Wald χ2 = 11,096.91 (p < .01)
Base Year = 2004
a
: Natural log-transformed
+

p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, two-tailed tests.

H3
H3
H4
H4
H5
H5
H5

Coeff.

1.69
-.03**
-.10*
.01
.04
.04**
-.80**
-.01**
.01*
.00**
-.02**
.09*
-.07**
-.14
-.10**
-.06**
.00+
.00**
-.39**
.00+
.20**
1.04**
-.05
-.78**

Standard
Error

1.45
.01
.04
.02
.12
.01
.15
.00
.00
.00
.01
.04
.02
.12
.01
.01
.00
.00
.05
.00
.05
.14
.06
.08
Yes

z value

1.17
-3.06
-2.35
.52
.38
4.80
-5.33
-4.84
1.99
4.09
-4.00
2.23
-2.86
-1.20
-13.40
-6.20
1.79
7.37
-7.90
1.70
3.95
7.41
-0.84
-10.25

107

TABLE 6
SIMPLE SLOPES ANALYSIS OF SIGNIFICANT INTERACTIONS
Estimated Impact on
Outlet-Level Sales
(Simple Slope)

t-value

p-value

Impact of clustering of the new focal outlet with other new outlets on outlet sales under shared ownership
Shared Ownership (Low)

-.03

-3.06

.00

Shared Ownership (High)

-.20

-7.04

.00

Impact of clustering of the new focal outlet with mature outlets on outlet sales under shared ownership
Shared Ownership (Low)

-.10

-2.35

.02

Shared Ownership (High)

.08

1.25

.21

Impact of clustering of the mature focal outlet with other mature outlets on outlet sales under shared ownership
Shared Ownership (Low)

.01

.52

.60

Shared Ownership (High)

.12

6.64

.00

Impact of clustering of the mature focal outlet with new outlets on outlet sales under shared ownership
Shared Ownership (Low)

.04

.38

.71

Shared Ownership (High)

-.67

-3.22

.00

Impact of clustering of the new focal outlet with mature outlets on outlet sales with respect to franchisor vs.
franchisee ownership
Franchisor vs. Franchisee Ownership (Franchisor-Owned)

-.10

-2.35

.02

Franchisor vs. Franchisee Ownership (Franchisee-Owned)

-.01

-.33

.74

Impact of clustering of the mature focal outlet with other mature outlets on outlet sales with respect to franchisor
vs. franchisee ownership
Franchisor vs. Franchisee Ownership (Franchisor-Owned)

.01

.52

.60

Franchisor vs. Franchisee Ownership (Franchisee-Owned)

-.06

-2.40

.02
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FIGURE 1
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Franchisor vs.
Franchisee
Ownership
Clustering
Geographic Concentration
of an Outlet
H5

Outlet Performance
Sales Revenue

H1-H2
Accumulated Experience
• of the Focal Outlet
• of Proximal Outlets

H3-H4

Shared Ownership

Control Variables
• Cluster Size
• Mean Age of Proximal Outlets
• Firm Size
• Royalty Rate
• Inter-brand Competition
• Market Population
• Income per capita
• Market Area
• Year
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FIGURE 2
CLUSTERING OF OUTLETS IN YEAR 2012
Clustering of new focal outlets with
other new outlets (Michigan)

Clustering of a mature focal outlet
with new outlets (California)

Clustering of mature focal outlets
with other mature outlets (Ohio)

Clustering of a new focal outlet with
mature outlets (Tennessee)

Mature Outlet

New Outlet
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FIGURE 3A
SIMPLE SLOPES ANALYSIS FOR SIGNIFICANT INTERACTIONS
(SHARED OWNERSHIP)
Panel 1:
Impact of Clustering of the New Focal Outlet with
Other New Outlets on Outlet-Level Sales

Panel 2:
Impact of Clustering of the New Focal Outlet with
Mature Outlets on Outlet-Level Sales

3.5

5

Outlet-Level Sales

Outlet-Level Sales

3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
-0.5

Low CL(NN)
Low SO

3
2
1
0

High CL(NN)

Low CL(NM)

High SO

Low SO

High CL(NM)
High SO

Panel 4:
Impact of Clustering of the Mature Focal Outlet with
New Outlets on Outlet-Level Sales

Panel 3:
Impact of Clustering of the Mature Focal Outlet with
Other Mature Outlets on Outlet-Level Sales
7

5

6

Outlet-Level Sales

Outlet-Level Sales

4

5
4
3
2

3
1
-1

Low CL(MN)

High CL(MN)

-3

1
Low CL(MM)
Low SO

High CL(MM)

-5

High SO

CL(NN): Clustering of the new focal outlet with other new outlets
CL(NM): Clustering of the new focal outlet with mature outlets
CL(MM): Clustering of the mature focal outlet with other mature outlets
CL(MN): Clustering of the mature focal outlet with new outlets
SO: Shared ownership of clustered outlets
Note: Outlet-level sales are natural log transformed

Low SO

High SO
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FIGURE 3B
SIMPLE SLOPES ANALYSIS FOR SIGNIFICANT INTERACTIONS
(FRANCHISOR VS. FRANCHISEE OWNERSHIP)
Panel 1:
Impact of Clustering of the New Focal Outlet with
Mature Outlets on Outlet-Level Sales

Panel 2:
Impact of Clustering of the Mature Focal Outlet with
other Mature Outlets on Outlet-Level Sales
2.5
2

Outlet-Level Sales

Outlet-Level Sales

2
1.5
1
0.5

1.5
1
0.5
0
-0.5

0
Low CL(NM)

High CL(NM)

Low CL(MM)

High CL(MM)

-1

Franchisor-Owned

Franchisor-Owned

Franchisee-Owned

Franchisee-Owned

CL(NM): Clustering of the new focal outlet with mature outlets
CL(MM): Clustering of the mature focal outlet with other mature outlets
Note: Outlet-level sales are natural log transformed
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APPENDIX 3A
COMPUTATION OF THE LOCAL MORAN’S I
The Local Moran’s I index (Anselin 1995) estimates clustering strength or spatial
autocorrelation of a focal outlet based on its geographic proximity from other outlets and
its attribute similarity or dissimilarity from other outlets simultaneously.
The Local Moran’s I (LMIi) for a focal outlet i can be computed as:
1)

LMIi =

(𝑥𝑖 −𝑋̅ )
𝑠𝑖 2

∑𝑛𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖 𝑤𝑖,𝑗 (𝑥𝑗 − 𝑋̅)

Where xi is an attribute of an outlet i, in our context, it is the age of outlet i. 𝑋̅ is the mean
of the corresponding attribute. wi,j is the spatial weight between outlets i and j. This
spatial weight is based on the inverse distance conceptualization. Therefore, lesser
distance means greater spatial weight. Finally, si2 can be calculated as:

si

2)

2

∑𝑛
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖 𝑤𝑖,𝑗
=
− 𝑋̅ 2
𝑛−1

Where n is the total number of outlets.
A positive value for LMIi indicates that a focal outlet i has neighboring outlets with
similar attributes. A negative value for LMIi shows that a focal outlet i has neighboring
outlets with dissimilar values. In both cases, it means that the focal outlet i is part of a
cluster. The LMIi approaches zero in case of a random spatial pattern. The LMIi is a
relative measure and can only be interpreted within the context of its computed z-score or
p-value.
In addition to the LMIi value for each outlet, the computation of the Local Moran’s I also
generates the cluster category of each significantly clustered outlet based on its attribute
(i.e., in this context, outlet age). The Local Moran’s I identifies outlets with low (i.e.,
younger age) and high (older age) attribute values by using normal distribution of outlets’
age and categorizes them as new and mature respectively, yielding four archetypal cluster
types. For our data, the Table below displays the age range of mature and new outlets, as
computed by the Local Moran’s I statistic. For example, in 2004, a mature outlet was at
least 8 years old, whereas a new outlet was at most 3 years old.
2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

Age Range for Mature Outlets
(in years)

8-27

9-28

9-29

8-30

9-31

10-32

11-33

12-34

13-35

Age Range for New Outlets
(in years)

0-3

0-1

0-2

0-3

0-4

0-5

0-6

0-7

0-8
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APPENDIX 3B
THE HAUSMAN-TAYLOR INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES (HTIV)
ESTIMATION
Panel data lend themselves to analysis by fixed-effects (FE) or random-effects (RE) estimation
approaches (Baltagi 2008). FE estimation yields consistent estimates but has the disadvantage
that it does not yield any estimates for coefficients of time-invariant variables. RE estimation,
however, leads to inconsistent estimates when the regressors are not independent of the
unobserved individual fixed error term. Hausman and Taylor (1981) proposed an alternative
model where some, but not all, the regressors are correlated with the individual fixed error term
(αi) and not with random error (uit). This model is based on an instrumental variable estimator that
uses both the between and within variation of strictly exogenous variables as instruments, and
does not rely on external instrumental variables.
This Hausman-Taylor Instrumental Variable (henceforth, HTIV) specification splits time- varying
(X) and time-invariant (Z) regressors into two sets of variables. The first set of regressors [X 1, Z1]
is assumed exogenous and not correlated with αi or uit, whereas the second set [X2, Z2] is
endogenous and is correlated with αi but not with uit (Baltagi, Bresson, and Pirotte 2003). The
HTIV approach makes the critical assumption that some of the regressors (X) are correlated with
the fixed error term, but not with the random error term [i.e., Cov (αi, X) ≠ 0, rather than Cov (uit,
X) ≠ 0] (Baltagi 2008). As our analysis includes both time-varying (clustering and shared
ownership) and time-invariant (franchisor vs. franchisee ownership) endogenous regressors, they
need to be tested for their associations with the fixed error term (αi).
The time-invariant endogenous regressors (Z) can only be associated with omitted fixed effects
(αi) and not with random errors (uit) (Boulding and Christen 2003). To investigate the association
of time varying endogenous regressors (X) with the fixed error term (αi), I use Ebbes, Bockenholt,
and Wedel’s (2004) two-step procedure to test for Xα-dependencies. First, I specified FE and RE
regressions for equation (2). Second, I compared both results by using the standard Hausman
(1978) test, where the null hypothesis assumes that X and αi are independent. The significant
result (p < .01) supported the Xα-dependencies.
In contrast to FE estimation, HTIV estimation accommodates both time-varying and timeinvariant regressors. To retain the time-invariant variables, the HTIV pre-multiplies the model by
Ω-1/2, where Ω is the variance-covariance term of the error component αi + uit (Baltagi 2008). This
estimation then runs a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression using [𝑋̃1, 𝑋̃2, 𝑋̅1, Z1] as
instruments (Baltagi, Bresson, and Pirotte 2003; Wooldridge 2010), where 𝑋̃1 and 𝑋̃2 are the
deviations from means of X1 and X2 respectively, 𝑋̅1 is the mean of X1, and Z1 is used as an
instrument for itself. For model identification, there must be at least as many elements in X1 as
those in Z2. The assumption guiding this approach is that deviations from the mean of the
explanatory variables can be validly excluded from the main equation as moment conditions,9
which can thus be reinterpreted as exclusion restrictions. To assess the suitability of HTIV over
FE estimation, I relied on Baltagi, Bresson, and Pirotte’s (2003) procedure. I estimated equation
(2) using HTIV, and undertook a comparison of FE with HTIV estimates, again using the
standard Hausman (1978) test. The non-significant result (p > .10) confirmed a preference for
HTIV over FE estimation. My use of HTIV specification is therefore appropriate.

9

The moment condition refers to any variable that, when measured in deviations from the mean, is
uncorrelated with the individual effect.
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Chapter 4
Conclusion

4.1) Discussion

My dissertation investigates the financial consequences of growth and geography in the
context of business format franchising. As well, I assess the tempering impact of
governance form on this growth-geography-performance relationship.

My first essay studies the association between growth of franchise systems and
franchisors’ terminations of franchisees, and subsequent financial performance at the
franchise system-level. Further, essay 1 investigates the moderating effects of ownershipbased governance, royalty rate (governance), and clustering (geography) on the growthfranchisor terminations relationship. In so doing, I am able to assess the interplay of
growth, governance, and geography, and investigate its performance implications for
franchise systems, both in terms of relationship terminations and its subsequent financial
consequences.

As franchised systems grow, their ability to monitor far-flung franchisee-owned outlets is
compromised. This erosion of monitoring capability reduces the threat of terminations,
which results in a greater propensity on the part of franchisees to shirk and thereby
leading to more terminations. However, the manner in which growth occurs poses
significant implications for this growth-termination association. Specifically, as
franchisors rely to a greater extent on ownership-based governance, higher royalty rates,
and clustering of outlets, their ability to pose a credible threat of termination of
noncompliant franchisees increases. It is this increase in the credible threat that serves to
dissuade franchisees from shirking, in turn, reducing the very necessity of terminations.
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Essay 2 investigates the interplay of growth, governance, and geography and its
performance implications for a single franchise system at the individual outlet-level.
Focusing on clustering (geography) of outlets, essay 2 studies the evolution (growth) of a
single franchise system from its inception in 1977 with just two outlets to its operation of
988 outlets in 2012. Essay 2 also investigates the effect of governance – shared
ownership (e.g., multi-unit franchisees) and franchisor vs. franchisee ownership – on this
clustering-performance relationship. Specifically, essay 2 takes the perspective of both
newly established and mature focal outlets; I posit and find evidence consistent with the
notion that the opportunity to share knowledge provided by clustering may or may not be
realized, depending on the motivation and ability of the newly established and mature
proximal and the focal outlets to transfer and absorb knowledge, and on the governance
context.

Essays 1 and 2, therefore, complement each other by studying related phenomenon using
two different datasets at two different levels of analysis. Whereas essay 1 studies the
performance implications of growth, governance, and geography at the franchise system
(macro level), essay 2 studies a similar phenomenon, but at the individual outlet-level for
a single franchise system (micro level).

Despite these complementarities, essays 1 and 2 differ from each other in several
important dimensions. Table 1 presents these points of differentiation. Essay 1 studies
performance implications of growth for the franchise system. It relies on a bigger sample
comprising 75 franchise systems observed over a decade. Its unit of analysis is the
individual franchise system. So as to deal with the potentially endogenous nature of our
regressors (growth, ownership-based governance, royalty rate, and clustering), I use the
endogeneity correcting control function approach (Petrin and Train 2010) to obtain
unbiased estimates. I find that growth increases franchisor terminations of franchisees,
but these terminations may be reduced when growth is achieved through greater reliance
on ownership-based governance, higher royalty rate, or greater clustering of outlets. I
further find that greater number of terminations improve franchise systems’ financial
position in terms of sales and profitability. I attribute this to lesser shirking, higher
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compliance, and quality provision on the part of franchisees (Bercovitz 2003; Rubin
1990). End-customer satisfaction and repeat purchases go up (Rust and Oliver 1994;
Taylor and Baker 1994), resulting in higher sales achieved by the franchise system. The
costs associated with the franchisor policing of franchisee compliance with the agreement
are also reduced (Kashyap, Antia, and Frazier 2012), thereby increasing the profitability.

Essay 2 assesses the impact of clustering on outlet-level sales performance. It studies the
evolution of a single franchise system from its inception in 1977 till 2012. Here, my unit
of analysis is the individual outlet. I use the Hausman Taylor Instrumental Variable
(HTIV) (Hausman and Taylor 1981) regression technique to obtain regression estimates.
As my model includes both time-varying (clustering and shared ownership) and binary
time-invariant (ownership-based governance) regressors, the use of the HTIV approach is
suitable because it handles both time-varying and time-varying endogenous regressors
and corrects for endogeneity using internal instruments.

Overall, my dissertation comprises two separate research studies that fall under the same
broad topic related to performance implications of growth, governance, and geographyrelated decisions in the context of business format franchising.

4.2) Practical Implications

The results of the present study have important implications for franchising practitioners.
Essay 1 indicates that franchise systems can grow faster without necessarily increasing
the franchisor terminations of franchisees by relying on ownership-based governance,
higher royalty rate, and greater clustering of outlets. The findings of essay 2 demonstrate
that the impact of clustering on outlets’ sales is contingent on outlets’ experience and the
governance context. These findings lead to practical implications for franchisors and
franchisees, as well as for those considering investing in franchise businesses (i.e.,
potential franchisees). In what follows, I consider the implications of my dissertation for
each of the preceding stakeholders.
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For franchisors. My findings suggest that franchisors should rely on ownership-based
governance, on higher royalty rates, or on clustering of outlets in their quest for growth.
Each of the preceding mechanisms enhances the monitoring motivation and/or ability of
franchisors, helps them detect franchisee non-compliance, in turn increasing the credible
threat of termination of errant franchisees. This increase in the credible threat serves to
discourage franchisees from shirking, therefore, reducing the need of terminations.

Furthermore, I find that new franchisor-owned outlets lose sales when clustered with
other outlets, regardless of whether these proximal same-brand outlets are newly
established or mature. We ascribe this adverse effect of clustering to the lower absorptive
capacity of newly established outlets, and their consequent inability to learn from other
proximal same-brand outlets. When such absorptive capacity is increased, as it is in the
case of mature outlets, the focal outlets’ sales performance is not adversely impacted by
multiple other proximal same-brand outlets. Thus, franchisors desiring to maximize sales
performance of their owned outlets are advised to avoid establishing new outlets in
proximity to other same-brand outlets (regardless of whether these outlets are newly
established or mature). For mature franchised outlets, however, our findings suggest no
such strictures need apply. These outlets’ sales performance does not appear adversely
impacted by proximity to other same-brand outlets. Once well-established, franchisorowned outlets need not fear the intra-brand competition that plagues their less wellestablished counterparts.

For franchisees. For franchisee-owned outlets, we would make the opposite
recommendations. Specifically, newly established franchisee-owned outlets, rather than
fear the intrabrand competition from mature outlets of the same brand, are well advised to
seek them out! These new outlets are demonstrated to gain from experience of proximal
mature outlets. It is the mature franchisee-owned outlets instead that find themselves
facing the prospect of intra-brand competition, and losing significant amount of sales.

For both franchisors and franchisees. For both franchisor- and franchisee-owned outlets,
shared ownership of the focal and proximal outlets does appear to help facilitate
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knowledge transfer and blunt intra-brand competition. Under shared ownership, newly
established focal outlets clustered with mature proximal outlets outperform their
counterparts clustered with new proximal outlets. This occurs for two reasons: first, all
outlets, whether newly established or mature, gain from the opportunity to learn through
direct contact (rather than solely rely on mimetic learning) from the experience of
proximally located mature outlets under the shared ownership. Second, and as important,
the fear of intrabrand competition is significantly mitigated by the common ownership of
the focal and the proximal same-brand outlets.

Our analysis and the subsequent calculation of sales elasticities paint a nuanced picture of
gains and losses attributable to proximity, depending on the ownership and experience
levels of both the focal outlet and those in its proximity.

For potential investors. My findings would also be useful for someone considering
investment in a franchise system. First, my results suggest that it is useful for investors to
understand the growth strategy of franchise systems before investment, i.e., not just how
much, but how such growth is achieved. Whereas franchise system growth is associated
with more franchisor terminations, this tendency for terminations is significantly reduced
when growth is achieved through ownership-based governance, higher royalty rate, or
greater clustering of outlets. Each of the preceding mechanisms “shifts” the credible
threat of termination, thereby eliciting a lower propensity for franchisee shirking. For
those considering becoming franchisees, our findings suggest a note of caution in
“chasing” high growth franchise systems. Although portrayed and perceived as “being on
a tear”, such systems tend to shed greater numbers of noncompliant franchisees unless
they rely on a higher proportion of franchisor-owned outlets, charge higher royalty rates,
or cluster the system’s outlets. Taken together, these findings help potential franchisees
avoid the trap of investing in franchise systems chasing unrestrained growth; rather, they
might invest in growing franchise systems that mind how they grow.

Findings from my dissertation (specifically, essay 2) suggest that potential new
franchisees should look at the clustering pattern of existing same-brand outlets before
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accepting a site for their new outlet. My results indicate that new franchisee-owned
outlets perform well when clustered with mature same-brand outlets. This is likely due to
new franchisees’ increased motivation to gain as much as possible from the experience
gained and knowledge shared by the clustered mature outlets. Potential new franchisees
are therefore advised to establish new outlets in proximity to mature same-brand outlets
to gain from their accumulated experience. Further, new franchisees may also pursue
multi-unit ownership strategy. Shared ownership of multiple outlets enhances motivation
to share knowledge as well as dampens intra-brand competition, which positively impact
newly established outlets’ performance.

Overall, the results of this research provide much-needed guidance to franchisors,
franchisees, and potential investors who want to better understand the performance
outcomes of growth strategies, ownership decisions, and location choices over an
extended period of time.

4.3) Limitations

My findings must be viewed in light of certain limitations. First, essay 1 uses a rich
dataset comprising 75 franchise firms operating in multiple industries observed over a
decade across 50 US states. These data include market-level (US state-level) locational
information of outlets, but lack street-level address information of the individual outlets,
precluding the estimation of clustering precisely at the individual outlet-level. Essay 2,
however, relies on data comprising street-level addresses of outlets, enabling me to
pinpoint the exact location of each of the 988 outlets in the sample. This dataset,
however, comprises outlets of a single franchise system. The study of the evolution of a
single franchise system controls for sector-specific heterogeneity, but also limits the
generalizability of my findings. Ideally, panel data comprising multiple franchise systems
from diverse industries with street-level outlet address information would be useful.

Another limitation that seems particularly relevant is that, in both essays 1 and 2, I rely
on unobserved conceptual mechanisms or intervening variables when specifying the
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rationale underlying hypothesized relationships. My first essay investigates the impact of
franchise system growth on franchisors’ terminations of franchisees, where I present my
logic underlying the growth-terminations relationship relying on unobserved intervening
variables – franchisors’ monitoring ability and franchisees’ compliance. Similarly, my
essay 2 rests on the conceptual mechanism of knowledge transfer from proximal outlets
to the focal outlet, which is unobserved. Future efforts to measure these unobserved
intervening variables – for example, by conducting surveys with the individual outlet
managers, or by designing laboratory experiments to provide a better understanding of
the underlying conceptual mechanisms – and to integrate them with the archival data
already available would add richness to the findings.

A third potentially important limitation relates to my use of secondary data. My reliance
on longitudinal archival data, while affording rich insights into actual rather than reported
behavior, cannot speak to the motivations underlying such behavior. I rely on proxy
variables with the assumption that the relationship between the proxy and the construct is
reasonable, and that the observed behavior patterns are consistent with my hypothesized
effects. Additional efforts to integrate archival data with some form of primary data (e.g.,
survey-based data) would add significant value to the research on this topic.

4.4) Future Research Directions

The results of this study have direct implications for research on franchising going
forward. In essay 1, I have so far investigated the impact of growth on the relationship
and financial performance of franchise systems. A promising avenue to explore is to
investigate how growth might impact financial returns, especially, stock returns. Many
franchise systems are publicly held and are followed closely by investors, who reward
high growth firms. At the same time, franchisees of these high growth franchise systems
may not be enamored by growth when new outlets are opened in proximity to the existing
ones. Investigating how growing franchise systems might balance the divergent interests
of these key stakeholders represents a potential fruitful avenue for research.
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In essay 2, I have looked at the impact of clustering of same-brand outlets on their sales
performance, and how this effect is tempered by outlets’ experience and the governance
context. The focus of this study is on the same brand. In reality, it is common to find
directly competing brands – i.e., outlets of different franchise systems belonging to the
same industry or sector, located close to each other. These rival brands’ outlets fiercely
compete with one another to attract customers and gain sales. Findings of this study can
be extended by investigating the impact of such inter-brand competition along with intrabrand competition. Specifically, we can categorize outlets based on their governance
structure, e.g., a franchised outlet affiliated with a chain, a non-franchised outlet affiliated
with a chain, and a non-franchised outlet not affiliated with a chain (e.g., a “mom and
pop” store). In a particular market, a focal franchised-chain outlet may be located in
proximity to several other outlets: 1) other same-brand franchised-chain outlets, 2)
franchised-chain outlets of competing brands, 3) non-franchised-chain outlets of
competing brands, and 4) non-franchised-non-chain outlets of competitors. Investigating
the impact of clustering of these outlets on the focal outlet survival would represent a
useful extension of my current study.

In summary, my research represents a useful step in exploring the performance
implications of growth and geography (clustering) for franchise systems at two different
levels of analysis – at the franchise system level and at the outlet level. It further assesses
the moderating impact of ownership-based governance. I hope that my research
stimulates further work relating growth and clustering to different measures of franchise
system performance and exploring further relevant boundary conditions that might shift
this critical relationship.
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TABLE 1
COMPARISON OF ESSAYS 1 AND 2
Dimensions

Essay 1

Essay 2

Research Questions

How does franchise system
growth impact franchisor
terminations and consequently its
financial performance?

How does a franchise system’s
evolving growth pattern impact the
individual outlets’ performance?

Agency Theory, Governance,
Cluster Theory (Monitoring
Efficiency)

Cluster Theory (Knowledge
Transfer), Intrabrand Competition,
Governance

75 franchise systems across 50
US states observed from 1993 to
2004

988 outlets of a single franchise
system across 50 US states
observed from 1977 to 2012

Unit of Analysis

Franchise System

Individual Outlet

Outcome Studied

Franchisor Terminations, Sales,
Profit

Outlet-Level Sales Revenue

Growth, Ownership-Based
Governance, Royalty Rate,
Clustering

Clustering, Shared Ownership,
Ownership-Based Governance

Control Function (Petrin and
Train 2010)

Hausman Taylor Instrumental
Variable (1981)

Franchise system growth
increases franchisor terminations
of franchisees, but growth relying
on governance, royalty rate, and
clustering decrease it. Greater
number of terminations improve
franchise systems’ financial
performance

The impact of clustering on outletlevel sales is contingent on outlet
experience and governance context

Theoretical Lenses Used

Research Context and Data
Collected

Predictors Included

Endogeneity Corrected Method
Used

Principal Findings
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